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THE DANGEROUS LAW OF BIOLOGICAL RACE 
Khiara M. Bridges* 
 
The idea of biological race—a conception of race that postulates that 
racial groups are distinct, genetically homogenous units—has experienced 
a dramatic resurgence in popularity in recent years.  It is commonly 
understood, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the idea 
that races are genetically uniform groupings of individuals.  Almost a 
century ago, the Court famously appeared to recognize the socially 
constructed nature of race.  Moreover, the jurisprudence since then 
appears to reaffirm this disbelief:  within law, race is understood to be a 
social construction, having no biological truth to it at all.  Yet upon closer 
examination, the Court’s apparent disbelief of racial biology is revealed to 
be as mythical as racial biology itself.  This Article argues that the Court 
treats “race” as a legal term of art, using the term in a “technical,” legal 
way to reference populations of people who are not presumed to be 
biologically or genetically homogenous.  In treating race as a legal term of 
art, however, the Court essentially hedges its bets by leaving open the 
possibility that race, in its “scientific” usage, describes persons who are 
united by biology or genotype.  In other words, while the Court has rejected 
racial biology in law, it has never rejected the possibility that, outside of 
law, race is actually a biological entity.  By not shutting the door 
completely to biological race, the Court, and the law more generally, is 
complicit in the resuscitation of one of the most dangerous inventions of the 
modern era. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Race, like Freddy Krueger, keeps coming back after we believe we kill 
it.”1 
In April 2012, Boston University’s daily newspaper, BU Today, ran a 
story with the eye-catching headline, BU Takes on Cancer:  Racial 
Disparities.2  It is the headline beneath the headline, however, that is truly 
provocative:  Genetics Can Trump Income, Access to Care.3  The article 
tells a tale that has become almost hackneyed in recent years:  black people 
are dying at disproportionately high rates from an illness, and genetic 
difference is offered as the explanation for the racial disparity in health.4  
This particular article explains that a team of researchers at Boston 
University has been probing “the role of genetics” in black women’s 
experiences with cancer.5  They concluded that “cancers can behave 
differently in different populations, so the medical establishment needs to 
stop treating them as if they were the same.”6  The story educates the 
reader: 
 
 1. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Praise for DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION:  HOW 
SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(2011) (inside flap of dust jacket). 
 2. Susan Seligson, BU Takes on Cancer:  Racial Disparities, BU TODAY (Apr. 9, 
2012), http://www.bu.edu/today/2012/bu-takes-on-cancer-racial-disparities/. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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The phrase cancer disparities refers to more than racial or socioeconomic 
gaps in access to cancer diagnosis and treatment.  As it turns out, all other 
things being equal, race and ethnicity account for significant differences 
in the incidence and survivability of certain cancers and in how well 
people respond to standard treatments. . . .  [C]umulative findings from 
several studies indicate that, regardless of their incomes and how early 
they are diagnosed, African American women are more likely to die from 
breast cancer than their white counterparts.  “At all ages mortality from 
breast cancer is higher for black women, and it’s clear now that it’s not 
due to differences in access, care, or treatments,” [one researcher] says.7 
According to these researchers, there is a genetic truth to race.  Different 
racial groups possess different genes.  Biological race—an idea of race 
within which racial groups are distinct, genetically homogenous or 
genetically similar units8—is not a myth; instead, it is a truth that may be 
“counterintuitive” to the medical community who, up until this point, had 
not studied the role of genetics in producing different cancer behaviors in 
different racial groups.9 
Yet, it is commonly understood that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected 
the idea that races are genetically uniform groupings of individuals.  Almost 
a century ago, in United States v. Thind,10 the Court famously appeared to 
recognize the socially constructed nature of race.11  In deciding that the 
term “white person” within the naturalization law at issue did not refer to 
persons who would be considered white according to “science”12 (i.e., 
Caucasians), the Court appeared to disbelieve racial “science.”13  Moreover, 
the jurisprudence since then appears to reaffirm this skepticism:  within 
law, race is understood to be a social construction, having no biological 
truth to it at all.14  Upon closer examination, however, the Court’s apparent 
 
 7. Id. (emphasis added). 
 8. See Deborah A. Bolnick, Individual Ancestry Inference and the Reification of Race 
As a Biological Phenomenon, in REVISITING RACE IN A GENOMIC AGE 70, 73 (Barbara A. 
Koenig, Sandra Soo-Jin Lee & Sarah S. Richardson eds., 2008) (observing that while 
“traditional notions of race” are variable, “most describe racial groups as equivalent, 
biologically distinct units”). 
 9. See Seligson, supra note 2. 
 10. 261 U.S. 204 (1923). 
 11. Professor Haney López’s work on Thind is probably the most definitive account of 
the case. See generally IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE (1997). 
 12. Because the belief that human races exist as biologically coherent groups has been, 
for the most part, widely rejected within modern science, this Article uses quotation marks 
around “scientific” and “science” when the reference is to archaic notions of biological race 
that were once championed by scientific disciplines like biological anthropology. 
 13. Thind, 261 U.S. at 208 (“[T]he words ‘white persons’ . . . are words of common 
speech and not of scientific origin.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (calling the 
program at issue racially discriminatory “whether or not it would be classified as racial in 
terms of modern scientific theory”); Id. at 610 n.4 (challenging the common understanding 
of biological race based on some scientists’ “conclu[sion] that racial classifications are for 
the most part sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature”); Morrison v. California, 291 
U.S. 82, 85 (1934) (“White persons, within the meaning of the statute, are members of the 
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disbelief of racial biology is revealed to be as mythical as racial biology 
itself. 
This Article argues that, while the Court uses the term “race” to refer to 
sociocultural and sociopolitical groupings of individuals who are not 
thought to share the same biology or genes, the Court allows for the 
possibility that race may actually be a biological entity.  Thus the Court 
treats race as a legal term of art, using the term in a “technical” way to 
reference populations of people who are not presumed to be biologically or 
genetically homogenous.  In treating race as a legal term of art, however, 
the Court hedges its bets by preserving the possibility that race, in its 
“scientific” usage, describes persons who are united by biology or 
genotype.  Thus, the Court has demonstrated a commitment to racial 
biology, albeit an implicit one. 
Differently stated, while the Court has rejected racial biology in law, it 
has never rejected the possibility that, outside of law, race is actually a 
biological entity.  By not shutting the door completely to biological race, 
the Court, and the law more generally, is complicit in the resuscitation of 
one of the most dangerous inventions of the modern era.  Biological race is 
a dangerous invention because it has dangerous consequences.  The 
extermination of racialized15 groups of people thought to be biologically 
inferior is one such consequence.16  Biological race is also dangerous 
because it argues that racial minorities—namely, black people—remain 
subordinated because of genetic inferiority, and not because of structural 
and institutional processes.17  When the explanation for enduring social 
subordination is genetic, the state and society are absolved of the 
responsibility for fixing the problem.18 
 
Caucasian race, as Caucasian is defined in the understanding of the mass of men.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 15. Because races are not biological entities, but rather socially constructed entities, a 
group must be constructed as a race in order to become a race.  The term “racialize” refers to 
the processes by which groups come to be constructed as races.  Accordingly, “racialized 
groups” are those groups that are thought of in racial terms. 
 16. See Osagie K. Obasogie, The Return of Biological Race? Regulating Innovations in 
Race and Genetics Through Administrative Agency Race Impact Assessments, 22 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (describing biological race as the foundation of eugenic policies 
and noting the devastation that such policies had on vulnerable, racialized populations); 
Statement on “Race,” AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N (May 17, 1998), 
http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm (describing the Holocaust as a demonstration of 
biological race at its “logical” conclusion). 
 17. See Obasogie, supra note 16, at 2 (observing that when biological race is offered to 
explain black people’s overall poorer health and shorter life spans, poor health and short life 
spans become understood as products of “fundamental differences between Whites and 
minorities” instead of consequences of social determinants). 
 18. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Is Race-Based Medicine Good for Us?:  African American 
Approaches to Race, Biomedicine, and Equality, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 537, 542–43 (2008) 
(noting that “a renewed belief in inherent racial differences provides an alternative 
explanation for persistent gross inequities in blacks’ health and welfare despite the end of de 
jure discrimination” and observing that “[p]lacing the responsibility for ending health 
disparities on individual health decisions or on taking race-based medications will weaken 
the sense of societal obligation to fix systemic inequities”). 
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In acknowledging and critiquing the idea of racial biology that courses 
through the Court’s jurisprudence, this Article finds company in an 
abundance of scholarship.19  It importantly diverges from the 
predominating literature, however, in at least one critical way:  most 
scholars argue that, at some point, the Court abandoned biological race and 
accepted race as a social construction.20  This Article adds an essential gloss 
on this point, which has become a truism in the scholarship on the issue:  
while the Court abandoned the idea, in the law, that the term “race” 
encompasses biological race, it has nevertheless remained committed to the 
possibility that race “really is” a biological fact outside of the law. 
The Court’s implicit commitment to biological race is evidenced most 
clearly by two areas of its jurisprudence:  (1) case law concerning American 
Indians, in which the Court explicitly uses race to mean biological race,21 
and (2) Title VII cases, in which discrimination on the basis of biological 
characteristics (i.e., skin color, hair) is identified as discrimination on the 
basis of race, and discrimination on the basis of nonbiological 
 
 19. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race:  Some Observations 
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994); Luis Angel 
Toro, “A People Distinct from Others”:  Race and Identity in Federal Indian Law and the 
Hispanic Classification in OMB Directive No. 15, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1219 (1995). 
 20. E.g., Natasha L. Minsker, “I Have A Dream—Never Forget”:  When Rhetoric 
Becomes Law, a Comparison of the Jurisprudence of Race in Germany and the United 
States, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 113, 126 (1998) (arguing that, at present, the Court’s 
opinions “reflect[] the notion that race is socially constructed and in no way based in 
biology”); Christian B. Sundquist, The Meaning of Race in the DNA Era:  Science, History 
and the Law, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 231, 256 (2008) (claiming that federal 
courts have rejected biological definitions of race and instead look for “racial markers” like 
self-identification, language, experiences, and physical traits). 
  In an important article, Donald Braman, an anthropologist and legal scholar, departs 
from the literature by arguing that the Court has never accepted the idea that biological race 
exists. See generally Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375 
(1999).  He contends that 
the scientific and legislative classificatory disarray, presented in briefs and oral 
arguments as early as Plessy v. Ferguson, has repeatedly moved the Supreme 
Court to understand and treat racial status as the product of social and political 
institutions. . . .  [T]he Court has not embraced a biological conception of race. 
Id. at 1380–81 (emphasis added).  Braman’s rereading of the Court’s jurisprudence is correct 
insofar as the Court may have never defined race within law as “biological race,” instead 
using race as a legal term of art denoting a socially constructed grouping of people.  It is 
important to note, however, that Braman’s argument is limited to the legal definition of race, 
a point that he acknowledges. See, e.g., id. at 1399–1400 (arguing that the Court believed 
that race, “at least as a legal matter, was a decidedly arbitrary statutory distinction, and that 
despite the powerful pull to consider racial status to be grounded in nature, the Court 
pragmatically held it to be political in practice” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 1446 
(“Repeatedly presented with evidence describing the diversity of popular classificatory 
schemes and the scientific community’s demonstration of the nonbiological nature of race, 
the Court has responded pragmatically.  It has treated and described racial status as the 
product of social and political institutions.”).  This Article notes, however, that in using race 
as a technical term, the Court simultaneously allows that there is a nonlegal use of race that 
references a biologically/genetically homogenous grouping of people.  Thus, this Article 
does not contradict nor disagree with Braman’s insightful history. 
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
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characteristics (i.e., language, accent) is identified as discrimination on the 
basis of national origin.22 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I gives a history of racial 
biology—describing the invention of the idea, its decline, and its recent 
resuscitation in medical science.  It continues by offering an accurate 
definition of race, defining a race as a group of individuals that has been 
differentiated from other groups of individuals, often in ways that 
homogenize the group and reduce them to a few defining characteristics.  In 
this way, race is “essentializing.”  Part II then considers the Supreme 
Court’s use of race, demonstrating, via a tour through some of the Court’s 
racial jurisprudence, that the Court clearly considers race to be a social 
construction representing a biologically heterogeneous grouping of persons 
who, because of historical, social, and political forces, have come to be 
thought of as a single race.  This Part also demonstrates, however, that the 
Court understands race within law to be distinct from race within the 
biological sciences.  Thus, the Court has created two conceptual entities:  a 
legal race that denotes socially constructed groups, and a scientific race that 
denotes biologically similar groups.  This Part contends that this rhetorical 
move functions to make the Court complicit in the resuscitation of racial 
biology, as it implicitly reaffirms the idea that there exist races that are not 
products of social construction, but rather are products of genetic 
homogeneity. 
Part III discusses two areas of jurisprudence where the Court’s implicit 
commitment to biological race is made explicit.  First, this Part observes 
that American Indian jurisprudence is not shy about defining race as 
biological race, and that doing so has resulted in bad law (that is, law that is 
antithetical to the interests of the American Indians—the subjects of the 
law).  Second, this Part explores cases in which plaintiffs have sued 
employers under Title VII for discriminating against them because they 
spoke a language other than English while at work or because they spoke 
English with an accent.  In these cases, the discrimination at issue is 
understood to be a question of national origin, not race.  This Part suggests 
that the reason why language and accent fail to be appreciated as racial 
characteristics and, instead, are appreciated as characteristics of national 
origin, is because courts are proceeding from the assumption that biological 
race exists.  Because differences in language and accent were never fault 
lines along which races were divided in so-called scientific schemas (unlike 
differences in skin color, hair texture, nose width, lip size, and eye shape), 
language and accent are not considered racial characteristics in Title VII 
case law. 
This Part concludes by observing that if the Court and lower courts 
actually wholly rejected biological race and accepted the accurate definition 
of race offered in Part I of this Article, then they would likely have to 
reconsider their Title VII jurisprudence.  Rejecting biological race would 
 
 22. See infra Part III.B. 
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likely result in more successful Title VII challenges for plaintiffs than under 
the current Title VII regime. 
Before beginning the exploration, it might be beneficial to underscore 
just why the Court’s implicit acceptance of bad science in the form of 
biological race matters.  First, it is relevant because, in this particular 
instance, bad science produces bad law—as both the analysis of American 
Indian law and Title VII case law in Part III reveals.  Second, it matters 
because of the discursive effects of the Court’s acceptance of biological 
race.  It is damaging and dangerous for the Court to communicate, albeit 
implicitly, that biological race is real—even if it proceeds as though racial 
biology does not exist.  An analogy or two might be illustrative. 
We should be particularly disturbed if the Court in Lawrence v. Texas23 
communicated that, while it believed that homosexuality was profoundly 
immoral for the purposes of the law, it would proceed as though gay 
persons were not morally depraved individuals undeserving of equal 
protection of the law.  Similarly, we should be disturbed if the Court in 
Craig v. Boren24 communicated that, while it believed that women were 
fundamentally inferior to men for the purposes of the law, it would proceed 
as though women ought to be able to participate equally in society.  In these 
examples, while one effect of the decisions in Lawrence and Craig would 
be to protect Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Questioning 
(LGBTQ) persons and women from discrimination, the decisions would 
also likely perpetuate problematic ideas about the same groups that they 
protect.  The same is true about the Court and biological race.  It is certainly 
accurate that the Court explicitly rejects biological race.  The Court’s 
implicit commitment to it, however—communicated most directly through 
American Indian law and Title VII case law—should not be ignored or 
dismissed as irrelevant.  Indeed, the Court is communicating its 
commitment to an idea that is responsible for some of the greatest tragedies 
of the modern era. 
Thus, this Article takes seriously the dialectical relationship between law 
and culture.  Pursuant to this theory, law produces culture just as culture 
produces law.25  To the extent that the law communicates the idea that 
 
 23. 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (striking down Texas’s criminal sodomy law because, 
among other reasons, “[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, 
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres”). 
 24. 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (holding that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level 
of review for laws that contain a gender classification because “[i]n light of the weak 
congruence between gender and the characteristic or trait that gender purported to represent, 
it [is] necessary that the legislatures choose either to realign their substantive laws in a 
gender-neutral fashion, or to adopt procedures for identifying those instances where the sex-
centered generalization actually comported with fact”). 
 25. See Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury:  Rape, Law, and Culture, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 457, 458 (2013) (discussing the dialectical relationship between law and 
culture); see also Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law:  Toward a Sociology of the Juridical 
Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 839 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987) (“It would not be 
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biological race is real, then it produces a culture that assumes that biological 
race is real.  Furthermore, to the extent that this culture assumes that 
biological race is real, it will inevitably produce a law that communicates 
that biological race is real.  And the dialectic turns.  Thus, this Article is an 
important intervention into the dangerous cycle that has functioned to 
sustain the mythology of biological race.  This Article calls upon the Court, 
and lawmakers generally, to recognize the fallacy of racial biology and to 
produce law that does not reproduce, either explicitly (as in American 
Indian jurisprudence) or implicitly (as in Title VII jurisprudence), this 
devastating modern myth.  If law refuses to reproduce the myth, then 
perhaps culture will refuse to believe the mythology.  In turn, we, as a 
society, would make great, essential strides away from a thought that is 
responsible for genocides, ethnic cleansings, and innumerable 
disenfranchisements—past and present. 
I.  A PRIMER ON RACIAL THEORIES 
Essentially, there are two competing theories about the nature of race.  
One theory argues that race has a biological essence.  Accordingly, 
individuals belonging to a race are united by shared genes and are 
genetically more similar to one another than to those of different races.  An 
opposing theory argues that race is a social construction—that race is a 
biologically arbitrary grouping of individuals.  Accordingly, individuals 
belonging to a race are not united by shared genes, but rather are united by a 
shared political, social, and cultural identification.  While advances in 
genomic science have worked to discredit the theory that there is a 
biological truth to race, it has been defended of late.  Indeed, one may refer, 
disturbingly, to recent surges in its popularity as a “renaissance.”  This Part 
gives a history of the idea—tracing its origins, decline, and revitalization.  
The Part then offers an accurate definition of race, defining what race is 
when commitments to a fantasied biological origin are rejected.  
A.  A Brief History of Racial Biology:  Birth, Death, and Rebirth 
Narratives that are told about the origins of biological race tend to begin 
with Europeans’ encounters with the various inhabitants of the African 
continent during the sixteenth century.  Indeed, famed historian of race, 
Winthrop Jordan, began his seminal tome on the origin and development of 
white racial hostility towards black people with the arrival of the English on 
the shores of West Africa.26  By the mid-eighteenth century, physician and 
 
excessive to say that [law] creates the social world, but only if we remember that it is this 
world which first creates the law.”). 
 26. WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK:  AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
NEGRO, 1550–1812, at 3–7 (1968) (describing the circumstances that first brought Europeans 
to Africa in the sixteenth century and noting that most descriptions that Europeans gave of 
the Africans they encountered focused on their physical bodies and how they differed from 
those of the observers); see also Nicholas Hudson, From “Nation” to “Race”:  The Origin 
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botanist Carl Linnaeus proffered that the species of Homo sapiens could be 
divided into four distinct types:  H. sapiens africanus, H. sapiens 
europaeus, H. sapiens asiaticus, and H. sapiens americanus.27  Linnaeus’s 
primitive division of humankind was not, however, the final word on the 
matter. Anatomist Georges Cuvier disputed Linnaeus’s schematization, 
submitting that humans could only be divided into three groups:  Caucasian, 
Mongolian, and Ethiopian.28  Meanwhile, physician Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach theorized that man was properly divided into five racial 
groups:  Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American, and Malay.29  
Although they disagreed on the particulars, these theorists agreed that 
biology demarcated racial groups.30 
Scientific and philosophic endeavors to partition human beings into 
discrete racial groups were not simply academic exercises.  Rather, they 
served to legitimate and justify political arrangements in societies around 
the globe.31  Particularly, biological race theory played a significant role in 
justifying the extermination and displacement of Native American societies 
and the establishment of the institution of African slavery in the United 
States.32  Racial biology operated to explain the seeming incongruence that 
describes a nation being founded on principles of the liberty and equality of 
individuals, while simultaneously tolerating the enslavement and massacre 
of specific groups of people.33  According to the science of the day, the 
biology of certain individuals made them unfit for freedom.34 
 
of Racial Classification in Eighteenth-Century Thought, 29 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 
247, 249–51 (1996) (same). 
 27. Holly Long, DNA Profiling:  The Ability To Predict an Image from a DNA Profile, 
in NONHUMAN DNA TYPING:  THEORY AND CASEWORK APPLICATIONS 185, 187 (Heather M. 
Coyle ed., 2008). 
 28. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 30. 
 29. See JOHANN FRIEDRICH BLUMENBACH, On the Natural Variety of Mankind, in THE 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL TREATISES OF JOHANN FRIEDRICH BLUMENBACH 99–100 n.4 (Thomas 
Bendyshe ed. & trans., 1865). 
 30. See Long, supra note 27, at 187. 
 31. See Statement on “Race,” supra note 16 (“[Race] became a strategy for dividing, 
ranking, and controlling colonized people used by colonial powers everywhere.”); see also 
Braman, supra note 20, at 1392–93 (“The intermarriage of scientific theories of race and 
legal doctrine throughout the nineteenth century is well documented, showing a strong link 
between schemas of racial difference and a variety of legal undertakings by government 
actors, including slavery, imperialist expansion, segregation, and eugenic sterilization.”). 
 32. See Statement on “Race,” supra note 16 (“Thus ‘race’ was . . . a growing ideology 
of inequality devised to rationalize European attitudes and treatment of the conquered and 
enslaved peoples.”). 
 33. Rose M. Brewer, Thinking Critically About Race and Genetics, 34 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 513, 513 (2006) (arguing that the racial hierarchies that were constructed were used 
to “explain the so-called inferiority of those with whom [Europeans] came into contact” and 
that non-European people “were ultimately conquered, colonized, enslaved, and drawn into 
European empires”). 
 34. Most racial schematizations featured not just a description of the physical features 
possessed by each race, but also personality and character traits suggesting that freedom was 
only appropriate for some races. See, e.g., JORDAN, supra note 26, at 220–21 (quoting 
Linnaeus’s description of the physical appearance and character traits of “American[s as] 
red, choleric, erect.  Hair black, straight and thick; Nostrils wide; Face freckled; Beard 
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The view that race is a social construction, with no fundamental 
moorings in biology or genetics, began to gain ascendance in the 1940s, 
when the murder of millions of Jewish persons and others in Nazi Germany 
demonstrated one of the most horrific consequences of biological race.35  
The Holocaust was not the only tragedy that biological race wrought, 
however—the eugenics movement in the United States deserves mention as 
well.  Premised on the belief that traits such as “intelligence, ‘feeble-
mindedness,’ criminality, alcoholism, [and] pauperism” were genetically 
determined, the eugenics movement sought to prevent the dissemination of 
the genes that determined such traits throughout the population.36  Efforts to 
purify the U.S. population of these problematic genes included immigration 
restrictions, antimiscegenation laws, and forced sterilizations.37  Indeed, it 
is no misnomer that eugenics was also referred to as “racial hygiene.”38  
Due to the belief that racial groups were distinct, genetically homogenous 
subsets of humans, nonwhite groups bore the brunt of eugenic policies, as 
the racial scientists of the day were convinced that undesirable genes were 
disproportionately found in nonwhite races.39  As Professor Obasogie 
explains: 
[B]etween 1937 and 1968, federal funds were used to sterilize over 35 
percent of women in Puerto Rico who were in their reproductive years.  
Native American women were similarly targeted for eugenic sterilization 
as early as the 1930s.  Between the early 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Indian Health Services forcibly sterilized 42 percent of all Native 
American women of childbearing age.  Black people have also been 
disproportionably targeted. . . .  Forced sterilization became so routine in 
some Southern Black communities that they were commonly referred to 
as “Mississippi [a]ppendectom[ies].”40 
 
scanty.  Obstinate, content, free.  Paints himself with fine red lines.  Regulated by habit”; of 
“European[s as] white, sanguine, brawny.  Hair abundantly flowing.  Eyes blue.  Gentle, 
acute, inventive.  Covered with close vestments.  Governed by customs”; of “Asiatic[s as] 
yellow, melancholy, rigid.  Hair black.  Eyes dark.  Severe, haughty, covetous.  Covered 
with loose garments.  Governed by opinions”; and of “African[s as] black, phlegmatic, 
relaxed.  Hair black, frizzled.  Skin silky.  Nose, flat.  Lips tumid.  Women’s bosom a matter 
of modesty.  Breasts give milk abundantly.  Crafty, indolent, negligent.  Anoints himself 
with grease.  Governed by caprice” (emphasis omitted)). 
 35. See Statement on “Race,” supra note 16 (“During World War II, the Nazis under 
Adolf Hitler enjoined the expanded ideology of ‘race’ and ‘racial’ differences and took them 
to a logical end:  the extermination of 11 million people of ‘inferior races’ (e.g., Jews, 
Gypsies, Africans, homosexuals, and so forth) . . . .”); Braman, supra note 20, at 1424 
(“[T]he rise of Nazi racial politics helped to crystallize much of the dissatisfaction with 
consistently unproven theories of racial difference.”). 
 36. Garland E. Allen, Eugenics and Modern Biology:  Critiques of Eugenics, 1910–
1945, 75 ANNALS HUM. GENETICS 314, 314 (2011). 
 37. See Obasogie, supra note 16, at 14 (describing the eugenics movement in the United 
States in the nineteenth century as a legal and political implementation of Linneaus’s racial 
typologies). 
 38. Id. at 18. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (alteration in original). 
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By 1951, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) was so confident in the fallacy of biological 
race—and so aware of the danger of the concept—that it issued a 
“Statement By Experts on Race Problems,” noting that race “is not so much 
a biological phenomenon as  a social myth.”41  That race is a social and 
political category, and not a biological one, has been reiterated officially 
from time to time by disciplines that are imagined to have expertise in 
addressing the issue.  For example, the American Anthropological 
Association (AAA) issued yet another “Statement on Race” in 1998, 
reaffirming what, by then, was close to becoming a truism:  race is a social 
construction.42  Perhaps as an apology for its own history as a thought 
collective that proudly created and legitimated biological notions of race,43 
the AAA spoke for the discipline of anthropology, observing: 
In the United States both scholars and the general public have been 
conditioned to viewing human races as natural and separate divisions 
within the human species based on visible physical differences.  With the 
vast expansion of scientific knowledge in this century, however, it has 
become clear that human populations are not unambiguous, clearly 
demarcated, biologically distinct groups.44 
 
 41. Press Release, Ashley Montagu, United Nations Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org., 
Statement By Experts on Race Problems 3 (July 20, 1950), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001269/126969eb.pdf.  The author of the statement, 
Ashley Montagu, was one of the more famous students of renowned granddaddy of 
anthropology, Franz Boas. See Kamala Visweswaran, Race and the Culture of Anthropology, 
100 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 70, 72 (1998).  Boas is fairly described as not only the 
granddaddy of modern anthropology, see GEORGE W. STOCKING, JR., THE ETHNOGRAPHER’S 
MAGIC WAND AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY 118–19 (1992) 
(arguing that Boas “more than anyone else shaped the character of American anthropology 
in the twentieth century”), but is also fairly described as being on the forefront of the 
intellectual movement to distance the discipline of anthropology from its racist past. See Paul 
Rabinow, For Hire:  Resolutely Late Modern, in RECAPTURING ANTHROPOLOGY 59, 60 
(Richard G. Fox ed., 1991) (“Boas’ case against racial hierarchies and racial thinking has 
thoroughly carried the theoretical day. . . .  Of course, racism has hardly disappeared, but it 
no longer is a scientifically credible position.”).  His primary move was to assign race to 
biology while arguing that biological/racial differences among humans were irrelevant; the 
more relevant human differences (indeed, the only relevant human differences) were 
cultural. See Visweswaran, supra, at 70–74 (describing the development of a Boasian school 
of thought in which race was understood as a biological category that could not explain 
variations among human societies, while the concept of culture came to have explanatory 
value for all divergences among groups and civilizations). 
  Interestingly, UNESCO backtracked on its first Statement on Race in a subsequent 
Statement on Race released a year later, in which the authors left open the possibility that 
perhaps racial differences did, indeed, reflect biological differences. See JENNY REARDON, 
RACE TO THE FINISH:  IDENTITY AND GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF GENOMICS 29–31 (2005) 
(noting that the second UNESCO Statement on Race, unlike the first iteration, asserted “the 
possibility that traits pertaining to ‘intellectual and emotional response’ could vary according 
to genetic differences between races”). 
 42. See Statement on “Race,” supra note 16. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
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The position that races are not biologically coherent categories of humans 
appeared to receive its final, and most unimpeachable, validation with the 
Human Genome Project’s mapping of the entirety of genes possessed by the 
human species in 2003.45  The Project revealed that all persons, without 
regard to racial ascription or identification, share 99.9 percent of the same 
genes, and it concluded—definitively—that humans could not be divided 
into coherent biological races.46  The imagined end of biological race was 
announced in happy and pithy sound bites, including then-President 
Clinton’s pronouncement that he believed that “one of the great truths to 
emerge from this triumphant expedition inside the human genome is that in 
genetic terms, all human beings, regardless of race, are more than 99.9 
percent the same.”47 
Perhaps it should have been expected that attention would then turn to 
that 0.1 percent genetic difference.  And that is precisely what happened.  
Shortly after the Human Genome Project provided proof that biological 
race was the stuff of myth, the New York Times ran an article proclaiming in 
its lead paragraph, “Scientists planning the next phase of the human 
genome project are being forced to confront a treacherous issue:  the genetic 
difference between human races.”48  The article was paradigmatic of 
something that then-President Clinton and others likely did not foresee:  the 
persistence of biological race.  Scientists and physicians continued to go on 
record proclaiming their enduring belief in racial biology.  For example, in 
another New York Times article titled I Am a Racially Profiling Doctor, 
psychiatrist Sally Satel contended, “In practicing medicine, I am not 
colorblind.  I always take note of my patient’s race.  So do many of my 
colleagues.  We do it because certain diseases and treatment responses 
cluster by ethnicity.  Recognizing these patterns can help us diagnose 
disease more efficiently and prescribe medications more effectively.”49  
Satel legitimated her practice of treating her patients differently on the basis 
of race by looking to that 0.1 percent of genetic difference: 
 
 45. The Human Genome Project was an international joint venture, undertaken by 
China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, in which the 
participating countries were responsible for sequencing different portions of the human 
genome. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 49. 
 46. See id. at 50. 
 47. Id.  Other jubilant sound bites include the head of the program’s statement that “I’m 
happy that today the only race that we are talking about is the human race.” Id.  The happy 
declaration that “the only race worth talking about is the human race” (and its logical 
sequitur that race should be ignored in biological science) sounds eerily similar to Justice 
Scalia’s declaration that “we are just one race . . . American” (and its logical nonsequitur that 
race should be ignored in law). Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 48. Nicholas Wade, For Genome Mappers, the Tricky Terrain of Race Requires Some 
Careful Navigating, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A17.  The article further noted that the 
question geneticists faced was whether to map differences across “population groups,” and 
further defined the “principal population groups” as “Africans, Asians, and Europeans.” Id. 
 49. Sally Satel, I Am a Racially Profiling Doctor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 5, 2002, at 56, 
56. 
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What does it really mean, though, to say that 99.9 percent of our content 
is the same?  In practical terms it means that the DNA of any two people 
will differ in one out of every 1,000 nucleotides, the building blocks of 
individual genes.  With more than three billion nucleotides in the human 
genome, about three million nucleotides will differ among individuals.  
This is hardly a small change; after all, mutation of a single one can cause 
the gene within which it is embedded to produce an altered protein or 
enzyme.  It may seem counterintuitive, but the 0.1 percent of human 
genetic variation is a medically meaningful fact.50 
The question becomes:  does the 0.1 percent difference prove the 
existence of biological race—or, stated differently, is racial difference 
located in the 0.1 percent of genes that we do not all share?  The question 
must be answered in the negative.  It is simply not true that two unrelated 
black people (that is, two people of the same race) share more of the same 
genes than an unrelated black person and a white person (that is, two people 
of different races).51  It simply does not follow that while a black person 
and a white person share 99.9 percent of the same genes, two black people 
will share 99.99 percent of the same genes and two white people will share 
99.99 percent of the same genes as well.52  The truth is that a black person 
 
 50. Id. at 58. 
 51. Sharona Hoffman, “Racially-Tailored” Medicine Unraveled, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 395, 
414 (2005) (“[I]ntra-group genetic variation is dramatically greater than inter-group 
variation.  For instance, Black people originating in Africa demonstrate more genetic 
variation than do people with recent ancestry from any other continent, so that two Black 
individuals are likely to be more dissimilar genetically than two members of any other 
‘race.’”); Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in 
Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 409 (2004) (“But with only a few exceptions, the 
variation within a race for a given trait is much greater than the variation across races.”); 
Sundquist, supra note 20, at 262 (“The vast majority of geneticists have affirmed that race 
has no biological meaning.  The DNA molecule simply does not give biological meaning to 
extant historical categories of race.  Geneticists have discovered that the greatest genetic 
variation occurs within so-called ‘racial’ population groups.”). 
 52. In this hypothetical, the example of a white person and a black person is used 
because popular racial logic holds that white people and black people represent “opposite” 
races and are, therefore, most dissimilar.  The reality, however, is that Africans and 
Europeans are more likely to share the same genes than, say, Africans and American Indians, 
because of the geographic proximity of Africa and Europe.  According to most legitimate 
accounts, homo sapiens originated in Africa. See Long, supra note 27, at 187.  Some of these 
groups of homo sapiens eventually migrated out of Africa. Id.  After thousands of years of 
migration, humans populated the globe.  The result is that human populations that are 
geographically close to one another are more likely to share the same genes because they are 
more likely to have shared ancestors. Race & Genetics FAQ, NAT’L COALITION FOR HEALTH 
PROF. EDUC. GENETICS, http://www.nchpeg.org/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=142&Itemid=64 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (“[P]opulations that are 
geographically closer together tend to be genetically more similar to one another. . . .  
[G]eographic neighbors are more likely to have historical connections and to exchange 
mates.”).  As Professor Roberts explains, 
Evolutionary biologists posit that geographic distance is a good predictor of 
genetic distance, and parts of Africa and Europe are swimming distance from one 
another.  The intimate intertwining of Europeans and Africans in the ensuing 
centuries through trade, conquest, enslavement, and migration make it absurd to 
consider them opposites from a genetic standpoint. 
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and a white person are more likely to share more of the same genes than 
two black people.53  This is due to the fact that, based on most accounts, the 
human species originated in Africa and, as a result, there is more genetic 
variation within African peoples than there is within non-African peoples.54  
As Professor Dorothy Roberts summarizes, “It turns out that the genes 
contributing to [racial markers like skin color, hair texture, nose width, lip 
size, and eye shape] represent a minute and relatively insignificant fraction 
of our genotypes and do not reflect the total picture of genetic variation 
among groups.”55  Instead, the 0.1 percent of genetic difference among 
humans is spread across the globe in a spectrum, making the demarcation of 
the human population into four or five (or ten or twenty or two hundred) 
races an exercise in arbitrariness.56 
Some genes, however, are traceable to specific geographic locations.  
This is because many members of an ancestral group that resided in a 
particular region may have possessed a particular gene; consequently, 
descendants of these ancestral groups are more likely to have that gene.57  
Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of geographic ancestry, as opposed 
to racial ancestry—with “ancestry” denoting the “geographic regions where 
one’s biological ancestors lived.”58  It is imperative to note, however, that it 
is generally incorrect to talk about “principal” geographic regions and to 
assume that those are Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Americas.  It is a fallacy 
to assume that geographic ancestry proves the existence of racial groups.59  
As Professor Roberts helpfully explains: 
 
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 69.  It may remain accurate, however, to state that white people 
and black people are “opposite” races when race is acknowledged to be a social construction, 
primarily because whiteness has been defined as that which is not black. See Cheryl I. 
Harris, Whitewashing Race:  Scapegoating Culture, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 916–17 (2006) 
(describing white and black as having been discursively constructed as opposite races). 
 53. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 52 (“A person from the Congo, a person from South 
Africa, and a person from Ethiopia are more genetically different from each other than from 
a person from France.”). 
 54. See Bolnick, supra note 8, at 71 (“Because Homo sapiens evolved in Africa before 
dispersing throughout the rest of the world, African populations are older and have had more 
time to accumulate genetic differences through mutation.” (citations omitted)). 
 55. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 52. 
 56. See Bolnick, supra note 8, at 72 (“Allele frequencies change gradually across 
geographic space, with few sharp discontinuities.”). 
 57. Professor Obasogie explains, “Over time, . . . evolutionary dynamics can lead certain 
markers to become strongly associated with [a] group. . . .  This uneven distribution of 
genetic markers can provide clues to their geographic origins, which can then point to the 
most closely associated population.” Obasogie, supra note 16, at 32.  However, individual 
“populations” do not match up with individual socially defined “races,” namely because 
“races” within current racial typologies are products of social, political, and socioeconomic 
forces. See id. at 36–37; see also Lillquist & Sullivan, supra note 51, at 425–46 (“[M]ost 
genetic differences are really differences between population groups, rather than between 
races.”). 
 58. Bolnick, supra note 8, at 70. 
 59. While “ancestry” purports to be a term that is more scientifically accurate than 
“race,” it is often used in ways that are as problematic as race.  Professor Bolnick notes that 
since current racial definitions are based on continental geography, “anthropologists and 
human geneticists use the term ‘ancestry’ much as the general public uses the term ‘race.’” 
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If you look at a map of the world, you will see that parts of Africa are 
very close to Europe and the Middle East and other parts are very far from 
these regions.  Because they are closer to the Arab Peninsula, African 
Somalis are genetically more similar to people in Saudi Arabia than they 
are to people in western or southern Africa.  Likewise, the Saudis are 
more similar to the Somalis than to Norwegians, who are geographically 
more distant.60 
Accordingly, a gene that traces to the Arab Peninsula may be found in 
the descendant of a Somali (who, according to popular racial logic, may be 
identified as a black person) and in the descendant of a Saudi (who, 
according to popular racial logic, may be identified as a white person).  
Roberts continues, “The same is true for Europe and Asia. . . .  Europe 
occupies the same land mass [sic] as Asia.  England is much closer to 
Turkey, the nation seen as bridging the two continents, than it is to the 
eastern edge of Russia.  Most of Russia is much closer to China than it is to 
Germany.”61  Accordingly, a gene that traces to Turkey may be found in the 
descendant of a Russian person (who is likely to be identified as white) and 
in the descendant of a Chinese person (who is likely to be identified as 
Asian). 
What this all means is that one cannot make (good) assumptions about 
the genetic composition of a person based on his race.  Thus, for example, if 
a person “looks like” she has an ancestor from Africa, it may mean that she 
is statistically more likely to possess a gene that has been traced to ancestral 
groups that resided in Africa.  A person who does not “look like” she has an 
ancestor from Africa, however, may also possess that same gene that has 
been traced to ancestral groups that resided in Africa.  As Professor Paul-
Emile powerfully summarizes, “Studies have shown that . . . a person 
whose skin color is perceived as white can have eighty percent recent West 
African ancestry, while a person whose skin color is perceived as black can 
have a predominance of alleles that indicate European ancestry.”62  
Moreover, a person who does “look like” she has an ancestor from Africa 
may not possess the gene that has been traced to ancestral groups that 
resided in Africa.  This exemplifies the simultaneous genetic 
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness of socially constructed racial 
categories. 
It is worth underscoring that throughout the birth, death, and rebirth of 
racial biology, the Supreme Court has not explicitly entered the debate and 
declared whether or not it believes racial biology exists.  Yet, a closer 
review of its jurisprudence shows its commitment to biological race.  Part II 
 
Id. at 81.  Moreover, ancestry among laypersons has come to be defined by political and 
cultural forces, and it is no longer a “purely scientific” term that indexes associations of 
people who share the same ancestors. Id. (observing that “ancestry is not that different from 
race in practice” as “ancestry is sometimes defined politically or culturally”). 
 60. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 74–75. 
 61. Id. at 75. 
 62. Kimani Paul-Emile, The Regulation of Race in Science, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1115, 1137 (2012). 
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explores the Court’s complicated approach to biological race.  First, 
however, an accurate definition of race is necessary. 
B.  An Accurate Definition of Race 
While race is not a biological phenomenon, there is no denying that it is 
real.  Indeed, in the United States, one’s race impacts the length of one’s 
life63 and the quality thereof.64  Race certainly exists and it has profound 
consequences.  The question then becomes:  when “scientific” definitions of 
race are rejected as pseudoscience, what is left of race? 
Anthropologist Kamala Visweswaran offers a helpful starting point for 
etching a definition of race.  She writes, 
The Middle Passage, slavery, and the experience of racial terror produce a 
race of African Americans out of subjects drawn from different cultures; 
genocide, forced removal to reservations, the experience of racial terror 
make Native Americans, subjects drawn from different linguistic and 
tribal affiliations, a race; war relocation camps and legal exclusion, the 
experience of discrimination make Asian Americans, subjects drawn from 
different cultural and linguistic backgrounds, a race; the process of 
forming the southwestern states of the United States through conquest and 
subjugation, the continued subordination of Puerto Rico constitute 
Chicanos and Puerto Ricans as races.65 
For Visweswaran, social events like enslavement, genocide, 
displacement, and disenfranchisement have created races.  Yet this 
definition (or perhaps simply her framing of it) may problematically 
privilege subordination, deprivation, and exploitation.  Race may be 
experienced by the racialized as more than a constellation of historical 
wrongs; it may also be a source of pride, joy, and strength.66  Nevertheless, 
 
 63. See generally Elizabeth Arias, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., United States 
Life Tables, 2008, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Sept. 24, 2012, at 3, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_03.pdf (showing different life 
expectancies for different racial groups). 
 64. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Money Income of People—Number by Income Level 
and by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin:  2009, 2012 STAT. ABSTRACT U.S. 459 tbl. 705, 
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0705.pdf (showing 
different per capita income levels for different racial groups). 
 65. KAMALA VISWESWARAN, UN/COMMON CULTURES:  RACISM AND THE 
REARTICULATION OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE 71 (2010); cf. Angel R. Oquendo, Re-Imagining 
the Latino/a Race, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 93, 93 (1995) (“[W]hat really unites 
Latino/as is their unique history of oppression.”).  Professor Visweswaran is likely indebted 
to the definition of race offered by Professors Omi and Winant in their highly influential 
sociology of race:  “race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and 
interests by referring to different types of human bodies.” MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD 
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, at 55 
(1994). 
 66. Cf. Ian F. Haney López, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure:  The Salience of Race to LatCrit 
Theory, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1143, 1196–97 (1997) (“Although racial victimization has been 
instrumental in the cultural formation of group identity . . . this is not the same thing as 
suggesting that racial group identities are solely determined by the negative forces of 
invidious racial discrimination.”). 
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Visweswaran’s concept of race is useful as a model for building an 
appropriate definition of race because it does not attempt to define race 
independent of history—such an attempted definition would imply that 
there is a truth to race that is independent of history.  Instead, race must 
always be historically grounded.  As such, to arrive at a definition of race, 
we must ask what race has done and been asked to do throughout history. 
The one feature that has been constant when considering race, throughout 
history, is differentiation.  Race has always been used to differentiate 
groups of humans in ways that are essentializing—that is, in ways that 
overwhelm the other aspects of the individual or group and reduce the 
multiplicity to a single racial element.67  Now, while a belief in the 
biological sameness of a group inevitably functions both to differentiate it 
from others who are not imagined to share that biology and to render 
opaque the heterogeneity within the group, this belief in biological 
sameness is not necessarily intrinsic to the concept of race.  Thus, the 
definition of race proposed by this Article differs from that proposed by 
Professor Haney Lopez, for example, who would require that the racial 
difference always be conceived as having biological origins.68  This Article 
does not require that the essentialized difference necessarily be imagined to 
have a biological origin—largely because such a requirement ignores the 
fact that culture can justify exclusions, deprivations, and subordinations 
equally racist as those justified by race.69  This is true even when culture is 
recognized as entirely learned and having no basis in biology or “nature.”70 
Accordingly, race is a term that purports to denote essentialized 
difference that is frequently, though not always, based in biology.  Thus, the 
way that one determines whether a term is racial (and, thus, whether a 
group defined by that term is a racial group) is not to ask whether it falls 
within some preexisting order of the world, but rather to ask about how the 
term is used.  If the term denotes essentialized difference, then one has 
stumbled upon a race.  While it is undeniable that at many (if not most) 
times over the course of history, the essentialized difference denoted by 
race has been framed in terms of inferiority and superiority, this hierarchical 
ordering is not intrinsic to the denotation. 
 
 67. Notably, Omi and Winant include the element of essentialism in their definition of 
racism:  “A racial project can be defined as racist if and only if it creates or reproduces 
structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race.” OMI & WINANT, supra 
note 65, at 71. 
 68. See Haney López, supra note 66, at 1152 (“Race is best understood as a process of 
social differentiation rooted in culturally contingent beliefs in the biological division of 
humans.”). 
 69. See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, REPRODUCING RACE:  AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PREGNANCY 
AS A SITE OF RACIALIZATION 131 (2011); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis:  Race 
Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
821, 848 (1997) (“Designations of cultural difference are used effectively by some in 
dominant power positions to justify excluding racialized groups from the polity.”). 
 70. See BRIDGES, supra note 69, at 131; Yamamoto, supra note 69, at 848. 
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Insofar as this Article defines race in terms of the work that it is being 
used to accomplish, the Article offers a definition of race that finds a 
kindred spirit in sociologist Paul Gilroy’s argument that race is a product of 
racism.  He describes race as an “impersonal, discursive arrangement, the 
brutal result of the raciological ordering of the world, not its cause.”71  In 
other words, the idea of race does not produce racism; instead, racism 
produces the idea of race.  Similarly, this Article argues that one does not 
determine whether a group is a race by looking to see if it falls within some 
division of human populations (in terms of biology, ancestry, nation, 
ethnicity, etc.); instead, one determines whether a group is a race by looking 
to see whether some need for differentiation has produced it as a race. 
Questions may arise, in any given instance, about whether an imagined 
difference is essentialized—an inquiry that bears on the ultimate question of 
whether a group is a racial group.  To answer these questions, history is 
instructive.  Is the difference similar to a difference attributed to other 
groups that history has called races?  An affirmative answer makes the 
attribution of racial status to the group easier.  It is an inquiry not entirely 
unlike determining that a group is a racial group by asking whether it has 
been a victim of racism.  Moreover, antiblack racism does not have to be 
the model against which all other groups’ experiences are compared.72  
Anti-Jewish racism is instructive, as are anti-Chinese, anti-Mexican, and 
anti-Muslim racisms.  As history progresses, the number of comparators 
will increase.  This is a good thing.  As race scholar Winant writes, “The 
main task facing racial theory today . . . is to focus attention on the 
significance and changing meaning of race.”73  As race and racial meanings 
inevitably change, a theory that identifies race by looking to the experiences 
of groups over time, and not just at one discrete historical moment, is 
capable of recognizing the evolving, pragmatic nature of race.  Such a 
 
 71. PAUL GILROY, POSTCOLONIAL MELANCHOLIA 39 (2005). 
 72. There is a current in the intellectual movement of Critical Race Theory that argues in 
favor of “black exceptionalism,” a position that contends that the experience of black 
persons should be understood as the paradigmatic experience of race and racism in the 
United States. See Leslie Espinosa & Angela P. Harris, Afterword:  Embracing the Tar 
Baby—Lat-Crit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1596 (1997) 
(“The claim of black exceptionalism can be supported in at least two ways:  by examining 
the historic and continuing centrality of African-American ethnicity to American political 
and social life; and by examining the centrality of anti-black racism to the patterns of 
domination we call white supremacy.”).  This position is based on the sense that, throughout 
history, antiblack racism was the stuff upon which race, as a concept, was built in the United 
States.  Moreover, extant laws designed to address racial discrimination are not a response to 
racism, generally, but rather to antiblack racism, specifically. See id. at 1599–1600 
(“American anti-discrimination law emerged in response to experiences of and with black 
people.”). 
  The problem with black exceptionalism is that it appears to intentionally fail to 
recognize the evolving nature of race, and therefore “misses” the experiences of other 
racialized groups, like Latinos, whose racial deprivations are justified on grounds different 
than those of black people (i.e., language, accent, nationality). See id. at 1612–19. 
 73. HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL CONDITIONS:  POLITICS, THEORY, COMPARISONS 14 
(1994). 
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theory avoids stagnation and the unfair elevation of one group’s experiences 
over others.  This is the racial theory that this Article proffers. 
Accordingly, “black” is a racial term (and “black people” a race) because 
it is used to denote essentialized difference.  “Muslim” is a racial term (and 
“Muslim people” a race) because it is used to denote essentialized 
difference.74  Similarly, “Mexican” and “Puerto Rican” are racial terms 
(and “Mexicans” and “Puerto Ricans” races) because they are used to 
denote essentialized difference. 
Consider more closely the examples of “Mexicans” and “Puerto Ricans.”  
People are considered “Mexican” even when they have never been to 
Mexico, and even when they are not citizens of Mexico, but rather, the 
United States.75  People are considered “Mexican” even when they do not 
 
 74. That “Muslim” is a racial category raises the question of when, if ever, it is proper to 
classify religious groups as racial groups. Interestingly, the law has struggled with this 
question somewhat—specifically in dealing with Muslim and Jewish plaintiffs who have 
claimed that they were discriminated against on the basis of their race.  For example, Shaare 
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb concerned a synagogue that had been spray-painted with anti-
Semitic slogans and symbols. 481 U.S. 615, 615 (1987).  The synagogue sued under § 1982 
of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits racially discriminatory interference with property 
rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (guaranteeing all citizens “the same right . . . as is enjoyed by 
white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property”).  The lower court had dismissed the synagogue’s claim, reasoning that Jewish 
people were not a race, and, consequently, discrimination against Jewish persons was not 
racial discrimination. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 
1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. at 615.  The Supreme Court reversed, noting that at the time that § 
1982 was passed, “Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then considered to be distinct 
races and hence within the protection of the statute.  Jews are not foreclosed from stating a 
cause of action against other members of what today is considered to be part of the 
Caucasian race.” Cobb, 481 U.S. at 617–18.  Ultimately, it has been unnecessary for courts 
to determine whether Jewish people, Muslim people, and other ethnoreligious groups are 
races or religions, as both race and religion are commonly protected categories within 
antidiscrimination law.  What is important is that the plaintiff falls into one of the protected 
categories and not into which precise category the plaintiff falls. See Nomi Maya 
Stolzenberg, Righting the Relationship Between Race and Religion Within Law, 31 OXFORD 
J. LEGAL STUD. 583, 585 (2011) (“Because the civil rights statutes recognize all of these 
categories as creating ‘suspect’ or protected classes, there is no need to sort out which 
protected group a particular plaintiff falls into, or what kind of discrimination he or she 
endured.”).  Nevertheless, this Article argues that Muslim and Jewish people should be 
considered races because they have been treated like races.  When racial biology is rejected, 
and races are understood to constitute groups of people who have been differentiated from 
other groups of people on the basis of some imagined characteristic, then it is clear that 
Muslim and Jewish groups are races. Cf. id. at 587 (“If the lesson of European history . . . is 
that race will ultimately be defined negatively, by the beliefs that racists impose on those 
they victimize, rather than positively, in terms of the self-conception of the group, then it 
makes sense to conclude that Jews and Muslims are races protected under civil rights 
laws.”). 
 75. During the Great Depression, the United States deported massive numbers of 
persons classified as “Mexican.” See Nicholas P. De Genova, Migrant “Illegality” and 
Deportability in Everyday Life, 31 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 419, 433 (2002).  Many of 
those deported were U.S. citizens and had a legal right to remain in the country. See U.S. 
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR:  CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN 
IMMIGRATION 11 (1980) (“Among those caught up in the expulsion campaign were 
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know how to speak Spanish76 and are otherwise unfamiliar with what 
(when homogenized) can be labeled “Mexican culture.”  People are 
considered “Mexican” just because their parents are Mexican.  Finally, 
people cannot stop being “Mexican” by some act of will.  Because 
“Mexican” denotes an essentialized difference, it is a racial term.77  The 
“Puerto Rican” example reveals that what is true about “Mexican” is not 
simply a matter of having a relationship to a country other than the United 
States.  Puerto Rico is not a nation, but a commonwealth of the United 
States.  Yet, like “Mexican,” people are considered “Puerto Rican” even 
though they are citizens of the United States.78  People are considered 
“Puerto Rican” even when they do not know how to speak Spanish and are 
otherwise unfamiliar with what (when homogenized) can be labeled “Puerto 
Rican culture.”  People are considered “Puerto Rican” just because their 
parents are Puerto Rican.  Finally, people cannot stop being “Puerto Rican” 
by some act of will.  Because “Puerto Rican,” like “Mexican,” “Muslim,” 
and “black,” denotes an essentialized difference, it is a racial term. 
The Supreme Court appears to accept this accurate definition of race.  
That is, the Court’s race jurisprudence appears to be premised on a rejection 
of racial biology and an acceptance of the socially constructed nature of 
race.  This ostensible acceptance of racial social constructionism, however, 
hides an implicit commitment to racial biology.  The next Part discusses  
how the Court has developed a definition of race within law that indexes 
socially constructed groups, even while it has clung tenaciously  to an 
outmoded belief that race within science refers to biologically distinct 
groups. 
II.  A JUDICIAL APPROACH TO RACE 
Presently, the Court does not treat race as if it were a scientific term.  
Instead, it would appear that the Court understands that race is a social 
 
American citizens of Mexican descent who were forced to leave the country of their birth.”).  
Thus, their “Mexicanness” endured despite their legal status as “Americans.” 
 76. See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:  
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules As the 
Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 
1347, 1364 (1997) (“But Latinos, whether fluent Spanish speakers or not, all have some 
common connection with the [Spanish] language.  If we do not speak it ourselves, then it is 
the language of our ancestors.” (alteration in original)). 
 77. This is not to say that biology has never been used to define “Mexicans” as a group.  
Professor Kevin Johnson notes that race scholars once explained Mexicans’ imagined 
propensity towards crime in terms of their biological composition.  Kevin R. Johnson, 
Hernandez v. Texas:  Legacies of Justice and Injustice, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 
163 (2005) (describing the infamous Sleepy Lagoon murder case, in which the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff testified “about the biological propensity of Mexicans toward crime,” stating 
that “because of their Indian roots, Mexicans had a ‘total disregard for human life that has 
always been universal throughout the Americas among the Indian population, . . . [and] this 
character flaw could not be remedied because ‘one cannot change the spots of a leopard’”). 
 78. Jones-Shafroth Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 731, 733 (2006) (creating a civil government for 
Puerto Rico and making residents of Puerto Rico U.S. citizens). 
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construction and that races are entities that do not fit within the various 
“scientific” schematizations offered by Linneaus, Cuvier, Blumenbach, and 
anthropologists of yore.79 Accordingly, the Court recognizes racial 
discrimination as discrimination against any racialized social grouping of 
individuals—even those groups that are not races within “scientific” 
schematizations.  For example, the Court does not require that racial 
discrimination be discrimination against an individual because she is 
“Caucasian,” “Ethiopian,” “Malay,” or “Mongolian.”  Rather, the Court 
recognizes that it is racial discrimination within the purview of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Acts when a person is 
discriminated against because she is “Mexican” or “Japanese” or “not 
Hawaiian.”  Moreover, the Court does not seem to imagine that a 
“Mexican,” “Japanese,” or “Hawaiian” person shares the same biology as 
others in her racial group. 
While the Court appears to embrace a nontraditional, fairly progressive 
understanding of race, this Part argues that this appearance is specious.  A 
close reading of the Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of race reveals that 
the Court has never rejected biological race.  The Court’s seeming embrace 
of race as a social construction is simply a façade.  The Court continues to 
embrace racial biology, albeit implicitly. 
A.  Distinguishing “Scientific” Race and Legal Race:  
The Racial Prerequisite Cases 
Ozawa v. United States80 and Thind v. United States81 are usually cited 
for the proposition that the Court has accepted that race is a social 
construction.82  A searching reading of the cases, however, demonstrates 
that the Court never really rejected racial biology.  Instead, the Court 
simply found that the meaning of race within law is different from its 
meaning within “science.”  Accordingly, when the cases are read in the 
context of the time—in a historical period in which the dominant belief was 
that racial biology existed and “most theorists of the time assumed a link 
between human biology, ability, character, and culture, all understood as 
integral aspects of determining racial types”83—Ozawa and Thind indicate 
that, through its articulation of race as a legal term of art that departs from 
its usage as a “scientific” term, the Court left open the possibility that racial 
biology exists. 
Furnishing the background for both cases is the Naturalization Act, 
which provided that only “aliens, being free white persons, and . . . aliens of 
African nativity and . . . African descent” could naturalize and become 
citizens of the United States.84  Ozawa raised the question of whether Takao 
 
 79. See Toro, supra note 19, at 1238–39. 
 80. 260 U.S. 178 (1922). 
 81. 261 U.S. 204 (1923). 
 82. See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 11, at 56. 
 83. Braman, supra note 20, at 1410. 
 84. Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 190. 
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Ozawa, a highly educated person of Japanese descent with fair skin, was a 
“white person” within the meaning of the statute.85  The Court easily 
answered in the negative: 
[T]he federal and state courts, in an almost unbroken line, have held that 
the words “white person” were meant to indicate only a person of what is 
popularly known as the Caucasian race. . . .  The appellant, in the case 
now under consideration, however, is clearly of a race which is not 
Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely outside the zone on the negative 
side.86 
Thus, the Court sided with the “science” of the day, arguing that “white 
person” as used within the statute aligned with “scientific” schematizations 
of whiteness, referenced by the category of Caucasian.  As the Japanese 
were not Caucasian within any biological or anthropological schema, a 
Japanese person was not a “white person” within law and was ineligible for 
naturalization. 
Thind, decided the following year, challenged the Court’s commitment to 
the prevailing scientific conception of race.  The litigation was initiated by a 
“high caste Hindu of full Indian blood, born at Amrit Sar, Punjab, India,”87 
who argued that, as a “Caucasian”—the race to which South Asians 
indisputably belong in most “scientific” racial categorizations of human 
variation—he was a “white person” and was eligible to become a United 
States citizen under the Naturalization Act.  The Court disagreed, departing 
from its finding in Ozawa that “white persons” meant “Caucasians” in the 
law at issue.  Instead, it found that “white persons” was properly interpreted 
in line with common parlance, as the authors of the statute and others 
untrained in the racial sciences would have used it.88  As the statute’s 
authors, and most people living in the United States at the time, would not 
have contemplated that a South Asian man, high caste or not, was a white 
person, the statute did not permit South Asians like Thind to become U.S. 
citizens.89 
In holding that “white person” within the Naturalization Act was 
properly defined in accordance with popular understandings of the term and 
not in accordance with “science,” the Court did not reject the proposition 
that race is a biological grouping of persons.  Nowhere in the opinion does 
the Court dispute the biological facticity of race.  Instead, it simply does not 
like what that facticity would compel:  the admission of dark-skinned 
“others” into the polity and the discursive construction of these “others” as 
 
 85. See id. at 189–90. 
 86. Id. at 197–98. 
 87. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S 204, 206 (1923). 
 88. Id. at 214–15 (“What we now hold is that the words ‘free white persons’ are words 
of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common 
man, synonymous with the word ‘Caucasian’ only as that word is popularly understood.  As 
so understood and used, whatever may be the speculations of the ethnologist, it does not 
include the body of people to whom the appellee belongs.”). 
 89. Id. at 215 (holding that “the body of people to whom the appellee belongs” is 
ineligible to naturalize). 
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equal to those whom the Court thought were actually white—i.e., persons 
hailing from “the British Isles and Northwestern Europe.”90 
This is not to say that the Court is not critical of “scientific” racial 
schematizations.  Indeed, the Court justifies its refusal to align legal race 
with scientific race by looking to the disputes “in the science of ethnology” 
on the proper division of the human population into racial categories.91  
That there was no one definitive “scientific” schematization of race 
provides a justification for the Court’s reliance upon common 
understanding when defining who is included within the category of “white 
persons.”  This does not mean, however, that the Court rejects the ultimate 
truth of biological race.  Consider the Court’s statement: 
The various authorities are in irreconcilable disagreement as to what 
constitutes a proper racial division.  For instance, Blumenbach has five 
races; Keane following Linnaeus, four; Deniker, twenty-nine.  The 
explanation probably is that “the innumerable varieties of mankind run 
into one another by insensible degrees,” and to arrange them in sharply 
bounded divisions is an undertaking of such uncertainty that common 
agreement is practically impossible.92 
Two things are notable about this passage.  First, the Court speaks about 
uncertainty.  It states that analysts of human variation cannot be sure that 
their divisions of the human population are the correct ones.  It does not, 
however, contend that correct divisions do not exist.  Instead, it simply 
observes that it is difficult to know whether any particular “scientific” 
schema is correct.  Second, the Court speaks about the lack of common 
agreement among analysts of human variation.  It is a leap of logic to 
conclude that, because the Court recognizes the practical difficulty of 
agreement, it is arguing that there is no objective truth about which to agree.  
Thus, the Court appreciates that researchers of human variation had not yet 
been able to decide upon racial truths; it does not appreciate that there are 
no racial truths upon which researchers of human variation can decide.93  
Moreover, even when it arrives at racial truths, the Court does not recognize 
a commitment to incorporate that truth into law, especially when the 
authors of those laws did not intend for that truth to be so reflected. 
Thus, it is an overstatement—perhaps even wishful thinking—to read 
Thind as an articulation of the Court’s recognition that race is a social 
construction.  Instead, the case merely represents the Court’s dissatisfaction 
 
 90. See id. at 213 (“The words of familiar speech, which were used by the original 
framers of the law, were intended to include only the type of man whom they knew as white.  
The immigration of that day was almost exclusively from the British Isles and Northwestern 
Europe, whence they and their forbears had come.”). 
 91. Id. at 208. 
 92. Id. at 212. 
 93. Professor Braman reads this passage as indicating the Court’s rejection of racial 
biology.  He writes that, with this acknowledgement of the uncertainty that characterized 
contemporary scientific endeavors into racial classification, “the Court dismissed racial 
science.” See Braman, supra note 20, at 1406.  Professor Braman is correct as long as one 
adds the qualification that the Court dismissed racial science as relevant to the law. 
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with racial “science” (with respect to both its findings as well as the 
intradisciplinary quarrels about those findings), and its desire to direct the 
law away from a troublesome, albeit dominant, episteme. 
Moreover, it is important to take seriously what the Court actually held in 
Thind:  the term “white person” within the Naturalization Act should be 
defined in accordance with ordinary conceptions of race.94  Given the fact 
that the belief that races were biologically distinct entities was a widely 
held, infrequently disputed position when Thind was decided, the ordinary 
conception of race incorporated biological race.95  Thus, Thind’s holding 
that race within law should follow its common definition outside of law is 
not one that represents a rejection of biological race primarily because 
ordinary meanings of race were informed by biological race.  This is a 
profoundly different position from the one commonly attributed to Thind—
that is, a position holding that race is a social construction with no basis in 
biology.96 
It is worth noting that if the Court had actually accepted the socially 
constructed definition of race, it might have found that both Ozawa and 
Thind were “white persons,” and, consequently, eligible to become U.S. 
citizens.  In other words, when whiteness is understood as a position of 
relative, racialized privilege,97 then both Ozawa and Thind inhabited some 
degree of whiteness98—Ozawa as a non-Chinese,99 educated man with 
 
 94. Thind, 261 U.S. at 214–15.  Of course, the Court’s holding in Thind—that “white 
persons” should mean what ordinary persons understood the term to mean—does not commit 
the Court to using for perpetuity the ordinary concept of race as it existed when Thind was 
decided.  The ordinary concept of race has transformed.  In other words, racial lines are 
drawn in changing and oft-confused ways.  Race is a social construction because racial 
definitions (and who is considered a member of a particular race) change over time.  To the 
extent that the Court committed itself to allowing race within law to reflect these changing 
meanings, then, indeed, it is true that the Court dedicated itself to the proposition that race is 
a social construction. 
 95. For example, the ordinary person at the time of Thind would believe that South 
Asians were biologically distinct from “real” white people. 
 96. See, e.g., HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 11, at 6 (arguing that the Court rejected racial 
biology in Thind). 
 97. See Harris, supra note 52, at 916 (“[W]hiteness in the United States has never been 
simply a matter of skin color.  Being White is also a measure . . . of ‘one’s social distance 
from Blackness.’” (quoting LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY:  
ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 224 (2002))).  She goes on 
to explain: 
Within the Black/White binary that undergirds prevailing social relations, “Black” 
and “White” signify ideological concepts and do not operate as phenotypic 
markers, nor even as racial categories in the sense of creating socially constructed 
communities.  Rather, Black and White are relationally constructed.  Whiteness is 
the position of relative privilege marked by distance from Blackness; Blackness, 
on the other hand, is a legal and social construction of disadvantage and 
subordination marked by the distance from White privilege. 
Id. at 917. 
 98. Professor Braman observes that certain immigrant groups had attained “whiteness” 
in previous historical periods by establishing a degree of privilege over other groups. See 
Braman, supra note 20, at 1405 n.117 (noting that “Irish immigrants . . . had established their 
whiteness by breaking their long-standing alliance with black Americans and taking up the 
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some degree of social capital,100 and Thind as a member of a caste that 
historically enjoyed a pronounced racialized privilege over other castes.  Of 
course, this was the argument that both petitioners made.  And the Court 
rejected the argument, refusing to accept the radical demands of a true 
commitment to the socially constructed nature of race. 
Perhaps it is essential for the law to recognize racial discrimination 
against social groups that do not fit within “scientific” racial 
schematizations in order to demonstrate that it has completely disavowed 
that biological race is relevant to the legal definition of race.  The Court has 
done this.  Interestingly, however, the path to this recognition has been 
rather timid and circuitous.  Moreover, along the way, the Court has 
avowed that its task is to proffer a legal definition of race that, as a practical 
matter, departs from a “scientific” definition.101  Korematsu v. United 
States102 is an entrée to an exploration of the Court’s timid acceptance of 
“nonscientific” races as races within law. 
B.  Legal Race As Ethnicity, Nationality, and Ancestry 
This section engages in a close reading of the Court’s decisions in 
Korematsu and Hernandez v. Texas in order to demonstrate that underlying 
the Court’s acceptance of “nonscientific” races as races within law is a 
thinly veiled conviction that there is a biological truth to race.  A review of 
more recent cases follows, revealing that the Court has never strayed from 
this implicit principle. 
1.  Korematsu v. United States 
In 1944, the Court, in Korematsu v. United States, was called upon to 
determine the constitutionality of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, which 
required that “all persons of Japanese ancestry” leave San Leandro, 
California, and, pursuant to another executive order, report to a 
concentration camp.103  The case is famous for many reasons, namely its 
status as the Court’s first articulation of the demand that strict scrutiny be 
 
antiabolitionist cause,” observing that “successive waves of immigrants had learned that one 
of the prices of American citizenship was a cultivated sense of black inferiority,” and 
highlighting that “just as the Irish claimed antiabolitionist positions as the price for entry into 
white America, eastern and southern Europeans . . . adopted anti-Asian sentiments to 
consolidate their positions as white Americans”). 
 99. The Chinese were the subject of extensive racial prejudice at the time that Ozawa 
was decided. See id. at 1402 (noting that, at oral argument, Takao Ozawa’s counsel 
contended that “if restrictions were in order, they were to be directed against contract 
laborers, those morally, mentally and physically unfit for citizenship and the Chinese, but 
with no restrictions against the Japanese race” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 100. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (noting that “the culture and 
enlightenment of the Japanese people” could be referred to in “complimentary terms”). 
 101. See infra Part II.B. 
 102. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 103. Id. at 215–16. 
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used to review laws that contain racial classifications,104 and its tragic 
upholding of the law at issue despite the Court’s purported application of 
strict scrutiny.105  Yet Korematsu is most relevant to the present discussion 
because of its unremarked-upon assumption that discrimination against the 
Japanese is racial discrimination.  Indeed, the Court does not waste any 
time wringing its hands about the fact that because Japan is a nation, 
“Japanese” might be something more akin to a nationality,106 or perhaps an 
ethnicity107 or ancestry,108 as opposed to race.109  It does not waste any ink 
questioning whether discrimination against a nationality, ethnicity, or 
ancestry is racial discrimination.  Nor does it answer the latter question in 
the negative and uphold the law because it does not contain a racial 
classification.  Instead, the Court assumes that Japanese is a race and 
upholds the law notwithstanding.110  The majority writes, 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility 
to him or his race.  He was excluded because we are at war with the 
Japanese Empire . . . [and] because [the military authorities] decided that 
the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of 
Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily.111 
 
 104. Id. at 216 (“It should be noted . . . that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil 
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all restrictions 
are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”). 
 105. See id. at 219 (upholding the law). 
 106. Of course, because many of the Japanese who were interned were U.S. citizens, their 
“nationality” was not “Japanese,” but rather “American.” See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and 
the Constitution:  Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
571, 583 n.55 (1995) (“Many of the interned Japanese Americans were citizens because of 
birth in the United States.  Their national origin was, therefore, the United States.”). 
 107. Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados:  On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
965, 983 (1995) (“Under a broad definition, ethnicity refers to physical and cultural 
characteristics that make a social group distinctive, either in the group members’ eyes or in 
the view of outsiders.”).  English and African American Studies scholar Werner Sollors 
offers an instructive definition of ethnicity: 
An ethnic group is . . . a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative 
common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one 
or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood.  Examples 
of such symbolic elements are:  kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in 
localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal 
affiliation, nationality, phenotypal features, or any combination of these.  A 
necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the 
group. 
Werner Sollors, Foreword:  Theories of American Ethnicity, in THEORIES OF ETHNICITY:  A 
CLASSICAL READER, at xii (Werner Sollors ed., 1996). 
 108. See Perea, supra note 106, at 574 (defining ancestry as “family descent or lineage”). 
 109. Notably, there was precedent for the Court’s recognition of a grouping of individuals 
by relationship to a nation as “races.” See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 
(1872) (“If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the 
Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, [the Fourteenth A]mendment may safely be 
trusted to make it void.” (emphasis added)). 
 110. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
 111. Id. 
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The dissent shares the majority’s assumption that discrimination against 
the Japanese is racial discrimination—and not discrimination on the basis 
of ethnicity, nationality, or ancestry that is distinct from racial 
discrimination.  In Justice Murphy’s passionate dissenting opinion, he states 
plainly his position that the law at issue is “an obvious racial 
discrimination”112 and, further, “[t]his exclusion of all persons of Japanese 
ancestry, both alien and non-alien, from the Pacific Coast area . . . goes over 
the very brink of constitutional power and falls into the ugly abyss of 
racism.”113  Indeed, Justice Murphy’s understandable disgust with the law 
is due to the fact that it is informed by the most traditional racial logic.  The 
act treats the Japanese as a racial group in the sense that it imagines a 
behavioral homogeneity amongst the multiplicity of individuals comprising 
the group—and moreover, that behavioral homogeneity is a product of 
birth.  The traditional racial logic argues that a Negro is a Negro by virtue 
of his birth to Negro parents, and, because of his being a Negro, he is 
presumed to behave as Negroes are wont to behave.  Similarly, the act at 
issue in Korematsu argued that a Japanese person is Japanese by virtue of 
his birth to Japanese parents, and, because of his being Japanese, he is 
presumed to behave as Japanese are wont to behave.114  Thus, 
the exclusion order necessarily must rely for its reasonableness upon the 
assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous 
tendency to commit sabotage and espionage and to aid our Japanese 
enemy in other ways.  It is difficult to believe that reason, logic or 
experience could be marshaled in support of such an assumption.115 
However, Justice Murphy’s conceptualization of why the Japanese are a 
race deserves further scrutiny.  Although Justice Murphy rejects the law’s 
presumption that one of the qualities inherent in being Japanese is an 
enduring and treasonous loyalty to Japan, he appears to accept the law’s 
conceptualization of Japanese in racial biological terms.116  Justice Murphy 
 
 112. Id. at 234–235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (describing the law as a “racial restriction”). 
 113. Id. at 233 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. Justice Murphy’s dissenting opinion documents that the military officer responsible 
for the exclusion order, Lieutenant DeWitt, was a virulent racist who believed both in 
biological notions of race and that biology determined behavior and personality.  DeWitt is 
quoted as describing the Japanese as “an enemy race” whose “racial strains are undiluted.” 
Id. at 236.  Further, “Japaneseness,” and its concomitant tendency to commit treason, was 
imagined to be as immutable as one’s biological constitution:  “It makes no difference 
whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese.  American citizenship does not 
necessarily determine loyalty. . . .  But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until 
he is wiped off the map.” Id. at 236 n.2 (alteration in original). 
 115. Id. at 235. 
 116. Id.  There is great historical work that has been done on how the Japanese were seen 
as a bad race of people, while Italians and Germans, with whom the United States was also 
at war, were seen as Fascists or Nazis.  That is, the Japanese were constructed as an 
essentialized race of evil people, while Italians and Germans were not constructed as a racial 
group, but rather were conceived to be nonessentialized persons, some of whom embraced a 
problematic political philosophy of fascism.  Professor Renteln writes, “German Americans 
were distinguished from the Nazis and Italian Americans were distinguished from the 
Fascists.  However, no differentiating nomenclature existed for the Japanese.” Alison 
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appears to believe that the Japanese are coherent as Japanese because of 
their shared biology:  “[t]he exclusion, either temporarily or permanently, of 
all persons with Japanese blood in their veins has no such reasonable 
relation.”117  By invoking the familiar trope of “blood,” Justice Murphy 
reveals that he—like other believers in biological race, likely including his 
colleagues on the Court who would uphold the law—views “race” as a 
discrete, clearly demarcated group of individuals sharing the same blood or 
biology.  Thus, Justice Murphy’s reasoning shows that he may have 
disagreed with Linnaeus, Cuvier, and Blumenbach only to the extent that 
they divided humanity into four or five racial groups.  For Justice Murphy, 
these schematizations simply were not exhaustive.  There were more than 
five racial groups in the world, and Japanese, clearly, was one. 
Justice Jackson, also writing in dissent, shares Murphy’s assumption that 
the exclusion law is a form of racial discrimination.118  Justice Jackson’s 
separate opinion, however, contains an interesting moment revealing his 
racial worldview: 
Had Korematsu been one of four—the others being, say, a German alien 
enemy, an Italian alien enemy, and a citizen of American-born ancestors, 
convicted of treason but out on parole—only Korematsu’s presence would 
have violated the order.  The difference between their innocence and his 
crime would result, not from anything he did, said, or thought, different 
than they, but only in that he was born of different racial stock.119 
It is not quite clear how to read Justice Jackson’s pronouncement that 
Korematsu was born of “different racial stock” than the German, Italian, 
and (presumably white) American in his hypothetical.  It could be that 
Justice Jackson conceptualizes them all as born from different racial stock 
than the others; thus, his hypothetical contains four people of four different 
racial stocks.  Or, more likely, Justice Jackson could be arguing that it is 
only Korematsu who is of different racial stock than the German, Italian, 
and American persons; thus, the German, Italian, and American are of the 
same stock and Korematsu is not.  If the latter alternative is what Justice 
Jackson is offering, then his thinking is clearly indebted to the race 
scientists who proposed four or five principal races.  Accordingly, the 
 
Dundes Renteln, A Psychohistorical Analysis of the Japanese American Internment, 17 
HUM. RTS. Q. 618, 621 (1995).  Professor Dower expands on this point as such: 
German atrocities were known and condemned from an early date, but in keeping 
with their practice of distinguishing between good and bad Germans, Allied critics 
tended to describe these as “Nazi” crimes rather than behavior rooted in German 
culture or personality structure.  This may have been an enlightened attitude, but it 
was not a consistent one, for in the Asian theater enemy brutality was almost 
always presented as being simply “Japanese.” 
JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY:  RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 34 (1986). 
 117. Korematsu, 234 U.S. at 235. 
 118. See id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s opinion has 
“validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting 
American citizens”). 
 119. Id. at 243 (emphasis added). 
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German, Italian, and (white) American would share the racial stock of 
“Caucasian,” while Korematsu’s “different racial stock” would presumably 
be that of “Malay” or “Asian.” 
What is important here is that Justices Jackson and Murphy, political 
liberals who would strike down the law as intolerable racial discrimination 
under the Constitution, both accepted the truth of racial biology.  It is not 
unreasonable to assume that, at the time of Korematsu, they were not 
outliers on the Court in this regard.  Thus, it should be unsurprising if the 
jurisprudence of the time reflects a commitment to biological race. 
2.  Hernandez v. Texas 
Almost a decade later, however, the Korematsu logic that discrimination 
against a group of people based on nationality or ancestry is racial 
discrimination did not carry over to Hernandez v. Texas.120  In Hernandez, 
the Court was called upon to determine whether a Mexican man convicted 
of murder was denied equal protection of the laws if “persons of Mexican 
descent” were excluded from jury service in the county in which he was 
tried.121  In the lower court, Texas argued (and the court agreed) that, even 
if Mexicans had been excluded from jury service, Hernandez had not been 
denied equal protection of the law as long as white people served on 
juries.122  The State contended that Mexicans were “white” within racial 
schemas.  Accordingly, as long as “white” persons had not been excluded 
from jury service, then Mexicans qua white persons had been represented in 
juror selection rolls, as mandated by the Constitution.123 
 
 120. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
 121. See id. at 476. 
 122. See Hernandez v. State, 251 S.W.2d 531, 535–36 (Tex. 1952). 
 123. See id. at 536 (“Mexicans are white people . . . .  The grand jury that indicted 
appellant and the petit jury that tried him being composed of members of his race, it cannot 
be said . . . that appellant has been discriminated against in the organization of such juries 
and thereby denied equal protection of the laws.”).  Interestingly, Texas’s argument that 
Mexicans were white was justified by the fact that Mexicans were legally white by virtue of 
the interaction between the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the naturalization laws of the 
United States.  To explain, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the signing of which ended the 
war between Mexico and the United States in 1848, made the Mexican nationals, who 
inhabited the land that the United States annexed as part of the spoils of war, United States 
citizens. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of 
Mexico, U.S.-Mex., art. IX, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 (“Mexicans who . . . shall not preserve 
the character of citizens of the Mexican republic . . . shall be incorporated into the Union of 
the United States, and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the 
United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States, according to 
the principles of the constitution . . . .”).  The naturalization laws that existed at the time, 
however, provided that only “white persons” could become citizens. An Act to Establish an 
Uniform Rule of Naturalization, 1 Stat. 103, 103–04 (1790) (limiting naturalization to “white 
persons”).  Thus, Mexicans, as citizens, were legally considered white. See Kevin R. 
Johnson, Racial Restrictions on Naturalization:  The Recurring Intersection of Race and 
Gender in Immigration and Citizenship Law, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 142, 143–44 
(1996) (“[S]ome persons often classified today as ‘non-Whites’ were treated as ‘Whites’ for 
naturalization purposes.  For example, persons of Mexican origin were classified as ‘White’ 
while Asians were not.”). 
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The Supreme Court overruled the lower court, ultimately deciding that 
Mexicans were not treated as white persons in society.124  Instead, they 
were treated as a distinct class, as revealed by the discrimination to which 
they were subjected.125  Because Mexicans were not white within the 
“attitudes of the community,” the Court found that they were not white 
within law.126  The logic that the Court uses to arrive at this holding, 
however, makes apparent that it did not believe that Mexican, like Japanese, 
is a racial category. 
The most obvious sign that the Court did not recognize Mexican as a race 
is because it never says that it does.  The Court spends a lot of time 
proclaiming that its past precedents have clearly held that it is inconsistent 
with the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude jurors on the basis of their “race 
or color.”127  The Court does not find, however, that if Mexicans were 
excluded from jury participation, it would be an exclusion on the basis of 
 
  Of course, the position argued by Texas—that Mexicans are white—is absolutely 
consistent with present problematic racial logic.  “Hispanics” or “Latinos” are not deemed to 
be a racial group; they are considered an “ethnicity.” See Haney López, supra note 66, at 
1148 (“[I]t is clear that in the United States there exists no widespread consensus that 
Latinos/as share a separate identity that can be specified in terms of race, as opposed to, say, 
ethnicity, national origin, or culture.  Indeed, if anything, the consensus seems to run the 
other way, rejecting any notion of racial distinctiveness and positing that while Latinos/as 
may constitute an ethnic group, individuals of this heritage are of every race.”).  Indeed, the 
2010 Census asks individuals to note if they are of “Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin” and, 
if so, whether they are “Mexican/Mexican-American/Chicano,” “Puerto Rican,” “Cuban,” or 
of another origin, like “Argentinean,” “Colombian,” “Dominican,” “Nicaraguan,” 
“Salvadoran,” and “Spaniard.”  Then, in a separate question, individuals are asked to note to 
which of fifteen itemized “races” they belong (i.e. “White,” “Black, African-Am., or Negro,” 
“Asian Indian,” “Native Hawaiian,” etc.). See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, FORM D-61, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010 (2009), available at 
http://www.census.gov/2010census/pdf/2010_Questionnaire_Info.pdf.  Scholars have 
expressed much dissatisfaction with this racial logic. See, e.g., Oquendo, supra note 65, at 93 
(condemning “‘racial’ subcategories, such as ‘Black Hispanics’ and ‘White Hispanics’” 
because “they project onto the Latino/a community a divisive racial dualism that, much as it 
may pervade U.S. society, is alien to that community”). 
  Some who argue that Latinos are as much of a race as the white and black races tend 
to do so by using problematic biological racial argumentation. See, e.g., Cameron, supra 
note 76, at 1359 (“Cortes, in leading the Conquest, initiated the uniquely Latino tradition of 
mestizaje, or the mixing of European and Indian blood by miscegenation, thus creating a race 
of people who never existed before.”).  Of course, Latinos are as “mixed” as are most, if not 
all, other racial groups. See Haney López, supra note 66, at 1184 n.127 (“[W]e should 
maintain a certain skepticism toward the claim that Latinos/as are ‘racially diverse’ in ways 
that other ‘racial’ groups are not.  In fact, the mestisaje [sic] or mixing of peoples that is 
often singularly associated with Latinos/as is a quintessential American tale for all groups.”). 
 124. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479. 
 125. Id. (citing various instantiations of anti-Mexican discrimination and noting that “the 
testimony of responsible officials and citizens contained the admission that residents of the 
community distinguished between ‘white’ and ‘Mexican’”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 477 (“In numerous decisions, this Court has held that it is a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws to try a defendant of a particular race or color under an 
indictment issued by a grand jury, or before a petit jury, from which all persons of his race 
or color have, solely because of that race or color, been excluded . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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“race or color.”  Instead, the Court—looking to Strauder v. West Virginia128 
for its contention that a law that excludes “naturalized Celtic Irishmen” 
from serving on juries may run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause129—
asserted that it must also be wary of exclusions that are like those made on 
the basis of race or color.130  The question, then, was whether 
discriminating against Mexicans was a discrimination that was like one 
made on the basis of race or color.  The Court held that it was, stating that 
excluding “persons of Mexican descent” from jury service is an exclusion 
on the basis of “ancestry or national origin”131—presumably like an 
exclusion on the basis of “race or color”—that is prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
That the Court was drawing an analogy between—and not directly 
equating—racial discrimination and discrimination against persons of 
Mexican descent is demonstrated quite clearly by the Court’s explanation of 
what it found relevant.  To determine whether Mexicans had, in fact, not 
been called to serve on juries, the Court observed it was appropriate to 
compare the percentage of persons with “Mexican or Latin-American” 
surnames residing in the county with the percentage of persons with those 
surnames who had served on juries.132  The Court reasoned:  “[J]ust as 
persons of a different race are distinguished by color, these Spanish names 
provide ready identification of the members of this class.”133  According to 
the Court, Mexicans were not a race that could be identified by color.134  
Instead, they were something distinct from a race that could be identified by 
Spanish surname.135  It is not unreasonable to conjecture that the Court’s 
 
 128. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
 129. See Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 477 (citing Strauder for the proposition that “the 
exclusion of a class of persons from jury service on grounds other than race or color may 
also deprive a defendant who is a member of that class of the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection of the laws” (emphasis added)). 
 130. Id. at 478 (“[D]ifferences in race and color have defined easily identifiable groups 
which have at times required the aid of the courts in securing equal treatment under the laws.  
But community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from the 
community norm may define other groups which need the same protection.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Haney López, supra note 66, at 1145 (noting that the Court overturned 
Hernandez’s conviction not because of a finding that Mexicans or Mexican Americans were 
a race, but rather because of a finding that differences other than race or color “might define 
groups needing the same protection” as racial groups). 
 131. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479, 482 (finding that juries should be composed of “all 
qualified persons regardless of national origin or descent”).  Of course, to the extent that 
some of the Mexicans who were excluded from juries were born in the United States, as 
many were, they were not discriminated against because of their “national origin”—their 
national origin was the United States. See Perea, supra note 106, at 587–88 (“For those 
persons who were United States citizens by birth, their national origin—their place of 
birth—was the United States.  The Hernandez v. Texas opinion refers to the terms ‘ancestry’ 
and ‘national origin’ as though they meant the same thing when they do not.”). 
 132. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 480–81. 
 133. Id. at 480 n.12. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Haney López, supra note 66, at 1146 (arguing that Hernandez is exceptional 
because, “at least on the surface the Court refused to consider Mexican Americans as a group 
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consistent underlying commitment to “scientific” schematizations of 
biological races, into which Latinos and Mexicans do not discretely fit, at 
least partly motivated the Court’s failure to comprehend Mexicans as a 
race.136 
3.  The Modern Era 
There is no longer any question that a group that is defined by its 
relationship to a nation, or that otherwise does not fit within “scientific” 
schematizations of race, is a “race” within the meaning of the law.  Thus, 
the Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,137 and Fullilove v. 
Klutznick138 before it, never worried about whether a law contained a racial 
classification if it demanded that a certain amount of contracting dollars go 
to a company owned by a “Spanish-speaking,” “Oriental,” “Indian,” 
“Eskimo,” or “Aleut” person.  That these groups are races within the 
meaning of the law, despite the fact that they are not races within “science,” 
is assumed.139 
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji offers the Court’s most explicit 
articulation of this principle.  Majid Ghaidan Al-Khazraji, a U.S. citizen 
who had been born in Iraq, sued his employer under § 1981 of the Civil 
 
defined by race or color”).  Professor Haney López suggests that the reason why the Court 
refused to treat Mexicans as a racial group was because Hernandez’s attorneys had argued 
throughout the litigation that Mexicans were members of the white race.  If Mexicans were 
white, then the case would involve white people who were victims of racial discrimination 
practiced by other white people. See id. at 1161. 
 136. See id. at 1163 (stating that the Court avoided “a racial understanding” of Mexicans 
because of “a biological conception of race”).  Another reason for the Court’s avoidance of 
“a racial understanding” of Mexicans may have been because the Court believed that 
“Mexicans” are not always visually identifiable as such, and, consequently, are unlike other 
paradigmatically visible racial groups that are treated with solicitude under the Equal 
Protection Clause. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection:  The 
Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 496 
(1998) (describing the Court’s former requirement that, in order to be considered a suspect 
class, a group must have “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristic[s]” and noting 
that these characteristics “stand as proxies for the concept of visibility”). 
 137. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 138. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 139. Nevertheless, it is clear that the authors of the statute embraced “scientific” race and 
its schematization of (three, or four, or five) principal races.  It defines the “Negro” who is 
preferred under the statute as “[a]n individual of the black race of African origin”; 
meanwhile, all the other preferred groups (“Spanish-speaking,” “Oriental,” “Indian,” 
“Eskimo,” or “Aleut”) are not defined as “races,” but instead “cultures” or “origins.” Id. at 
494–95.  Now, within “scientific” racial logic, it may be that (American) “Indians” ought to 
be referred to as a race.  The likely reason why the authors of the statute did not refer to this 
group as a race may be that, because American Indians have a special relationship with the 
United States, the statute could define “Indians” by reference to those organizations that 
afford them protection pursuant to their special relationship with the United States—and not 
by reference to race. See id. at 495 (defining “Indian” as “[a]n individual having origins in 
any of the original people of North America and who is recognized as an Indian by either a 
tribe, tribal organization or a suitable authority in the community,” which includes 
“education institutions, religious organizations, or state agencies”). 
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Rights Act, claiming that he had been denied tenure because of his race.140  
The question for the Court was whether an Arab person, who would be 
considered Caucasian within “scientific” definitions of race, could be a 
victim of discrimination wrought by another member of the Caucasian 
race.141  Simply put:  was Caucasian-on-Caucasian discrimination 
cognizable as racial discrimination under § 1981? 
In an opinion filled with dicta evidencing a progressive, nonbiological 
understanding of race,142 the Court held that Arab should be considered a 
racial group distinct from a Caucasian race, and, as such, a white person 
could discriminate against an Arab person on the basis of the latter’s 
race.143  The Court noted that, as a general matter, the term “race” had been 
used throughout history to refer to groups that did not fall within 
“scientific” schematizations of race.144  Equally convincing to the Court 
was the legislative history of § 1981, which revealed that the authors of the 
statute did not seem to believe that race, as used within the statute,145 ought 
to refer only to those groups that “science” would identify as such.146  Yet, 
 
 140. Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazarji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987). 
 141. Id. at 609–10 (asking whether § 1981 “encompass[es] claims of discrimination by 
one Caucasian against another”). 
 142. Indeed, the Court’s opinion contains a discussion of race that seems to foreshadow 
the pronouncement made by geneticists in the wake of the Human Genome Project’s 
conclusion that race is a biologically arbitrary category: 
There is a common popular understanding that there are three major human 
races—Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid.  Many modern biologists and 
anthropologists, however, criticize racial classifications as arbitrary and of little 
use in understanding the variability of human beings.  It is said that genetically 
homogenous populations do not exist and traits are not discontinuous between 
populations; therefore, a population can only be described in terms of relative 
frequencies of various traits.  Clear-cut categories do not exist.  The particular 
traits which have generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized 
as having little biological significance.  It has been found that differences between 
individuals of the same race are often greater than the differences between the 
‘average’ individuals of different races.  These observations and others have led 
some, but not all, scientists to conclude that racial classifications are for the most 
part sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature. 
Id. at 610 n.4.  Importantly, this discussion is dicta and located in a footnote. 
 143. Id. at 609–10. 
 144. See id. at 611–12 (looking to nineteenth-century encyclopedias, which had used the 
term “race” to refer to “Finns,” “gypsies,” “Basques,” “Hebrews,” “Swedes,” “Norwegians,” 
“Germans,” “Greeks,” Italians,” “Spanish,” “Mongolians,” “Russians,” “Arabs,” “Jews,” and 
“Hungarians”). 
 145. To be precise, the statute does not mention the term “race.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) 
(2006) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in 
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, 
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”).  The statute has been construed, however, to 
condemn all racial discrimination. See Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 609 (“Although § 1981 does 
not itself use the word ‘race,’ the Court has construed the section to forbid all ‘racial’ 
discrimination in the making of private as well as public contracts.” (citing Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168, 174–75 (1976))). 
 146. Id. at 612 (citing the legislative history, which used “race” to refer to 
“Scandinavian[s],” the “Chinese,” “Latin” groups, the “Spanish,” “Anglo-Saxon[s],” “Jews,” 
“Mexicans,” “blacks,” “Mongolians,” “Gypsies,” and “Germans”). 
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this is the crux of the Court’s disappointing conceptualization of race:  the 
finding that race as used within the law is distinct from, and more 
expansive than, biological race presupposes that there are actual biological 
races.  The Court says as much, stating that discrimination on the basis of 
“ancestry or ethnic characteristics” is racial discrimination within the 
meaning of § 1981, “whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms 
of modern scientific theory.”147 
Moreover, there should be no doubt that the Court believes that it is 
biology, or more specifically genetics, that is the stuff of race within 
“modern scientific theory”:  the Court approvingly cites the lower court’s 
holding that the statute bans discrimination against “an individual ‘because 
he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically 
distinctive subgrouping of homo sapiens.’”148  This statement deserves a 
little unpacking.  First, the Court rejects the lower court’s pronouncement 
with respect to its inclusion of the term “physiognomically,”149 thus 
rejecting any requirement that an individual must prove that he or she was a 
member of a group that has physical markers of difference in order to assert 
a claim for racial discrimination under § 1981.  More importantly, however, 
the Court does not reject the lower court’s language with respect to 
genetics; that is, when the problematic reference to physiognomy is 
stricken, one sees that the Court accepts the proposition that the statute bans 
discrimination against “an individual because he or she is genetically part of 
an ethnically . . . distinctive subgrouping of homo sapiens.”150  This is 
interesting, partly because the term “ethnicity” is thought to refer to 
groupings along the lines of culture, as opposed to groupings along the lines 
of genetics.151  The Court’s problematic inclusion of genetics in the concept 
of ethnicity, however, makes it appear that it believes that an ethnicity is a 
genetically similar subgrouping of a larger grouping of a genetically similar 
race.152  Differently stated, the Court’s language suggests that, within its 
ontology of race and ethnicity, it is genetics that makes ethnic 
“subgroupings,” which are nevertheless cognizable as races within law.  
 
 147. Id. at 613. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. (“It is clear from our holding, however, that a distinctive physiognomy is not 
essential to qualify for § 1981 protection.”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Toro, supra note 19, at 1227. 
 152. Professor Haney López has explained how ethnicity, which is supposed to be 
premised on shared culture, nevertheless remains conceptually tethered to biology and 
genetics: 
Yet even as ethnicity ostensibly offered an alternative to the vocabulary of race, it 
remained closely tied to the complex of racial ideas. . . .  [E]thnicity sought to 
preserve the notion that descent powerfully shaped individual and group identity; it 
did so by emphasizing cultures closely associated with and indeed handed down 
generation by generation within distinct groups. Because ethnic culture depended 
on familial and kinship ties, ethnicity was not primarily a matter of volition but, 
like race, of blood. 
Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”:  Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary 
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1007 (2007). 
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Thus, the Court appears only to reject biological race in the sense of 
schematizations that offer only four or five “principal” or “primary” races.  
What is significant, and problematic, is that if legal race includes ethnicity, 
and if biology is relevant when defining ethnicity, then biology remains 
relevant within legal race. 
Nevertheless, even if the Court misspoke in Al-Khazraji and understands 
ethnicity as a biology-free concept, the Court’s jurisprudence has never 
completely endorsed the belief that race is socially constructed and 
simultaneously completely refuted the idea of racial biology.  Consider the 
admission program at issue in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,153 which reserved sixteen seats in the entering class at UC Davis 
medical school to members of a “minority group,” defined as “Blacks,” 
“Asians,” “American Indians,” and “Chicanos.”154  It is possible to 
understand the first three groups as “scientific” races—H. sapiens 
africanus, H. sapiens asiaticus, and H. sapiens americanus (or Ethiopian, 
Mongolian, and American, depending on which racial scientist’s schema is 
favored).  However, “Chicano” refuses “scientific” schematization as it is 
not a “scientific” race.  Perhaps this explains why Justice Powell’s oft-cited 
and highly influential opinion concerns itself with the constitutionality of 
decisions based on “race or ethnic origin” or “race and ethnic 
background.”155  His opinion wonders about the legality of lines that are 
“drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status.”156  It also worries about the 
consequence of “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions”157 made by and within 
law.  It is not unreasonable to conclude that this concern with “race and 
ethnicity” is due to the fact that Justice Powell is drawing a distinction 
between “scientific” races (like the blacks, Asians, and American Indians 
preferred by the admissions program) and “ethnicities” (like “Chicanos”), 
which are distinct from “scientific” races. 
That this is Justice Powell’s view of the ontology of race (for him, a 
biological concept) and ethnicity (for him, a nonbiological concept) is 
affirmed by his decidedly nonoriginalist explanation of why strict scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause is appropriate for all racial classifications 
and not solely those that burden the historically disadvantaged while 
privileging the historically advantaged.  Citing the Slaughter-House Cases, 
Justice Powell acknowledges that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified 
with the “one pervading purpose” of facilitating equality for the “slave 
race.”158  He notes, however, that it became “no longer possible to peg the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for equality of one 
racial minority”159—that is, black people.  There was the eventual 
 
 153. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 154. See id. at 274. 
 155. Id. at 287, 299 (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. at 289. 
 157. Id. at 291 (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. at 291 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873)). 
 159. Id. at 292 (emphasis added). 
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recognition that the historically advantaged race—the white race—was 
composed of “various minority groups of whom it was said . . . that a 
shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups.”160  
Citing cases that provided relief to “Celtic Irishmen,” “Chinese,” “Austrian 
resident aliens,” the “Japanese,” and “Mexican-Americans,” Justice Powell 
writes, “As the Nation filled with the stock of many lands, the reach of the 
Clause was gradually extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from 
official discrimination.”161  Notably, when Justice Powell intends to refer to 
black people—that is, a “scientific” (Negro) race—he uses the term “race” 
or “racial minority.”162  In contrast, when he intends to refer to groupings 
of people that are not “scientific” races, he uses the term “ethnic groups.”163  
In this way, he demonstrates his assent to “scientific” schematizations of 
race and the biological difference that they presuppose.  Sadly, the Court’s 
jurisprudence has never departed from this path. 
To be clear, Justice Powell, and the Court’s jurisprudence on race as a 
general matter, accepts the notion that a law that contains a preference for 
an ethnic group distinguishes groups on the basis of race.164  This race is a 
legal term of art; race as used within law is understood as broader than race 
 
 160. Id. at 292.  Professor Haney López has conducted an insightful, historically informed 
reading of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. See generally Haney López, supra note 152.  
Justice Powell began his argument in favor of using strict scrutiny for laws that benefited 
racial minorities by contending that there was no “white majority” that disadvantaged 
nonwhite minority groups; instead, the purported “white majority” actually consisted of 
various white minority ethnic groups. See id. at 1035.  Accordingly, nonwhite racial 
minorities in the United States were not accurately described as being uniquely 
systematically disadvantaged by political processes and, therefore, the sole just beneficiaries 
of heightened judicial review of laws that burdened them. See id. at 1036 (quoting Justice 
Powell’s assertion that “[i]t is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to 
all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater 
than that accorded others”).  Instead, nonwhite racial minorities were just one of many 
minority groups competing for political power; they, like every other minority group, 
deserved heightened judicial review of laws that disadvantaged them. See id. at 1040 
(describing Justice Powell as arguing that “the possibility of the group subordination—of 
whites—justified special solicitude in racial cases”).  Professor Haney López writes that 
Justice Powell’s rhetorical move of analogizing nonwhite racial groups’ experiences to those 
of white racial groups “erased the enormous differences in historical experience between 
white immigrants and racial minorities, and gave new legitimacy to the belief that not 
structural disadvantage but inability, now cultural rather than innate, explained the social and 
material marginalization of racial minorities in the United States.” Id. at 1009. 
 161. Id. at 1035 (emphasis added). 
 162. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293 (“[M]any of the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment conceived of its primary function as bridging the vast distance between 
members of the Negro race and the white ‘majority.’” (emphasis added)). 
 163. See id. at 292 n.32 (noting that “[m]embers of various religious and ethnic groups 
. . . such as Jews, Catholics, Italians, Greeks, and Slavic groups” continue to experience 
discrimination (emphasis added)). 
 164. Id. at 314–15 (framing the question posed by the case as whether the “racial 
classification” contained in the UC Davis Medical School’s admission program is “necessary 
to promote [ethnic diversity]”); id. at 319 (“[I]t is evident that the Davis special admissions 
program involves the use of an explicit racial classification never before countenanced by 
this Court.  It tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally 
excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering class.”). 
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as used within “science.”165  In distinguishing legal race from biological 
race, however, the Court implicitly validates biological race.166  For those 
interested in both revealing biological race as one of the most enduring (and 
dangerous) myths of the modern era, as well as freeing the culture of it, the 
law’s implicit acceptance of it is disturbing. 
The next Part shows the law’s continuing commitment to biological race 
by examining American Indian law and Title VII case law. 
III.  BIOLOGICAL RACE IN TITLE VII AND AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 
This Part completes the exploration of biological race in the law by 
investigating American Indian law, in which the Court clearly assumes that 
race is a biological category of individuals. Indeed, to be recognized as an 
“American Indian” within law, one must demonstrate that one has a certain 
degree of “Indian blood”—an explicit biological classification. The Part 
then turns to Title VII law, in which discrimination on the basis of 
biological characteristics is cognized as racial discrimination while 
discrimination on the basis of nonbiological characteristics is cognized as 
national origin discrimination. The reason for this dichotomy, of course, is 
courts’ implicit commitment to biological race. 
A.  Legal Race As Biological Race:  American Indian Law 
The body of law regulating the relationship between the United States 
government and American Indian tribes and their members is an interesting 
source of information in an examination of the Court’s racial ontology.  
Notably, within American Indian law, race clearly denotes biological race.  
Simply put, the Court made its otherwise implicit acceptance of racial 
biology explicit with this body of law.  Thus, American Indian law can and 
should be read as revealing the Court’s conceptualization of race generally. 
The Court’s decision in United States v. Rogers167 is an instructive place 
to begin, as this case indelibly inscribed the relevance of biological race 
into American Indian law.  In Rogers, the Court had to decide whether it 
was possible for a white person to be an Indian.168  The litigation began 
when Rogers, a white man, was accused of murdering another white man 
who, like he, had lived as a Cherokee Indian.169  When Rogers was brought 
to the Arkansas District Court to answer for his crime, he argued that he, as 
 
 165. See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (stating that 
“racial discrimination” occurs when a law treats differently “identifiable classes of persons 
. . . solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics”). 
 166. Of course, Powell’s intention when distinguishing legal race and biological race in 
Bakke likely had little to do with validating biological race and everything to do with 
allowing the white majority—reconceptualized as a group of white minority ethnic groups—
to become a suspect class deserving of the same protections as traditional racial minorities. 
See Haney López, supra note 152, at 1035–36. 
 167. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846). 
 168. Id. at 571. 
 169. Id. at 567–68. 
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well as his victim, were Indians and, as a consequence, the U.S. government 
did not have jurisdiction over him pursuant to the Trade and Intercourse Act 
of 1834.170  The question for the Court was, could (and should) a white man 
who had joined the Cherokee Nation, married a Cherokee woman, and lived 
as a Cherokee Indian be considered a Cherokee Indian?171  The Court 
answered in the negative.172  Justice Roger B. Taney, who would go on to 
author the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision a little over a decade 
later,173 wrote the opinion of the Court, noting: 
[W]e think it very clear, that a white man who at mature age is adopted in 
an Indian tribe does not thereby become an Indian. . . .  He may by such 
adoption become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, and make 
himself amenable to their laws and usages.  Yet he is not an Indian; and 
the exception [in the Trade and Intercourse Act] is confined to those who 
by the usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as belonging to 
their race.  It does not speak of members of a tribe, but of the race 
generally,—of the family of Indians . . . .174 
It is quite reasonable to conclude that the Court’s reluctance to believe 
that a white man could be an Indian was based on the idea that race has a 
biological essence.175  If race is in the biology—in the genes—then, 
naturally, it would be impossible for a biologically white man to transform 
himself into a biological Indian.  That Rogers had lived his life as a 
Cherokee Indian and was accepted as a Cherokee Indian was irrelevant:  
“He was still a white man, of the white race, and therefore not within the 
exception in the act of Congress.”176 
Rogers has been read as establishing a two-part test for determining 
“Indianness”:  an “Indian” is a person who has (1) a certain degree of 
“Indian blood,” and (2) is recognized as an Indian by a federally recognized 
 
 170. Id. at 568; see also Gregory D. Smith, Note, Disparate Impact of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines on Indians in Indian Country Why Congress Should Run the Erie 
Railroad into the Major Crimes Act, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 483, 492–93 (2004) (stating that 
the General Crimes Act, which stems “from the 1790 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act . . . 
expressly exempted from federal jurisdiction Indians who commit an offense against another 
Indian while in Indian country”). 
 171. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 570–71. 
 172. Id. at 572–73. 
 173. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that a black man was 
not a “person” within the U.S. Constitution), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
 174. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572. 
 175. See Frank Shockey, Note, “Individious” American Indian Tribal Sovereignty:  
Morton v. Mancari Contra Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Rice v. Cayetano, and Other 
Recent Cases, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 275, 285–86 (2001) (arguing that Taney’s opinion in 
Rogers “interpreted the exception in the Trade and Intercourse Act as applicable only to a 
pseudo-scientifically defined race of Indians” and contending that “Taney saw American 
Indians in this case as a physically defined race”). 
 176. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573. 
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tribe or government.177  Thus, in order to be an Indian in law, there is a 
sociolegal prerequisite (i.e., recognition by a tribe) and a racial prerequisite 
(i.e., possession of Indian “blood”).178  Importantly, the racial prerequisite 
is clearly based on biological notions of race.  Race is in the blood—the 
telltale symbol of biological, now genetic, race. 
Not only is the Rogers two-part test still used by courts to determine 
whether a person is an Indian for the purposes of establishing federal 
jurisdiction in criminal cases,179 but the case, as a general matter, ushered 
into federal Indian law the notion that Indians are a “biological population” 
as opposed to a political population.180  It also set the tone for American 
Indian jurisprudence.181  The jurisprudence has explicitly accepted that 
biological race determines whether a person is an Indian and, therefore, 
 
 177. See Quintin Cushner & Jon M. Sands, The Outdated “Blood” Test To Determine 
Indian Status in Federal Criminal Prosecution, 59 FED. LAW. 31, 34 (2012) (describing the 
two-part test). 
 178. That “Indianness” is not comprised solely of a racial component has saved statutes 
that give preference to Indians from strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause.  
In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Court had to determine whether a law that 
gave a hiring preference to “Indians” within the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) contained a 
racial classification that is properly reviewed with strict scrutiny.  The Court answered in the 
negative.  In holding that rational basis review was appropriate, the Court differentiated 
“members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities” from Indians as a race. Id. at 554 (“The 
preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as 
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the 
BIA in a unique fashion. . . .  [T]he preference is reasonably and directly related to a 
legitimate, nonracially based goal.”).  Rational basis review was appropriate for the law at 
issue because it did not classify on the basis of race, an admittedly suspect classification for 
which strict scrutiny was appropriate.  Instead, the law distinguished members of “federally 
recognized tribes” from “others,” a nonsuspect classification:  “The preference is not 
directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members 
of ‘federally recognized’ tribes” and thus “the preference is political rather than racial in 
nature.” Id. at 553 n.24.  Within the Court’s logical apparatus, Indians is a discrete racial 
group while a “federally recognized tribe” is a discrete political group.  When the Court 
expands upon its distinction between the political category that is referenced in the statute 
and the racial category of Indians not referenced, it looks to the guidelines set out in the law 
and notes that those who may benefit from the preference “must be one-fourth or more 
degree Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized [sic] tribe.” Id. at 553 n.24.  
Thus, reflecting the Court’s decision in Rogers, there are two qualifications—one racial and 
one political—that those who can enjoy the preference must have.  The Court reads the 
statute as indexing a political category because the Court allows the political qualification, 
membership in a federally recognized tribe, to erase (or satisfy) the racial qualification.  
What is important here is that the racial qualification is clearly based on a biological notion 
of race; racial membership is defined in terms of blood—again, the telltale symbol of 
biological, and now genetic, race. 
 179. See Cushner & Sands, supra note 177, at 33. (“Federal courts continue to use this 
two-pronged test to determine who is an Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction.”). 
 180. See Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 
1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 48 (2006) (describing Rogers as constructing Indians as a 
“biological population”). 
 181. Shockey, supra note 175, at 286 (“Most importantly, Rogers approved the use of 
racial criteria in determining tribal membership, and implicitly, in other matters relating to 
Indians.  Subsequent cases expanded that approval luxuriantly.”). 
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entitled to the benefits that are a product of the “special relationship” that 
the United States has with the Indian tribes.182 
The biological definition of Indianness is probably most apparent in the 
requirement that individuals prove the quantum of Indian blood that they 
possess in order to be deemed an “Indian” for purposes of federal Indian 
law.183  This question of “blood quantum” is ubiquitous in American Indian 
law.  It arose most dramatically during the era of government allotment of 
Indian lands to individual members of Indian tribes,184 but remains relevant 
in current disputes about whether the federal government has jurisdiction 
over a crime that has been committed.185 
 
 182. The “special relationship” that American Indian tribes have with the United States is 
a product of the fact that they are considered to be “sovereign” nations within the tribal 
nation’s borders. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832) (holding that 
the Cherokee Nation was a sovereign entity, “a distinct community occupying its own 
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no 
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the 
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress”).  The 
sovereignty of the American Indian tribes is compromised, however, because of the tribes’ 
location within the borders of the United States; as a consequence, they are reduced to 
“domestic dependent nations” within the United States. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (denominating American Indian tribes “domestic dependent 
nations”).  Accordingly, the United States has duties to them that it does not have to other 
sovereigns. See id. (“[American Indian tribes] are in a state of pupilage.  Their relation to the 
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.  They look to our government for 
protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and 
address the president as their great father.”). 
 183. See Spruhan, supra note 180, at 1 (“Both for federal recognition as an ‘Indian’ and 
for membership in a tribal nation, a person generally must possess a threshold amount of 
Indian or tribal ‘blood,’ expressed as one-half, one-quarter, or some other fractional 
amount.”).  Commentators have argued that “blood” became relevant in American Indian 
law because it was thought that the more white “blood” an Indian had, the more civilized and 
capable of independence he became. See id. at 44 (quoting a 1917 “Declaration of Policy” by 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs stating that “it is almost an axiom that an Indian who has 
a larger proportion of white blood than Indian . . . so far as the business world is concerned, 
he approximates more closely to the white blood ancestry”).  For example, Spruhan writes, 
The use of blood quantum combined the concepts of Indian as a member of a 
biological group and Indian as an incompetent ward.  Both Congress and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs used blood quantum as one of the defining elements of 
competency to release whole classes of Indians, while retaining restrictions on 
others.  Congress then conditioned funding and, for certain tribes, membership 
itself, based on blood quantum, limiting its responsibilities to a subset of biological 
wards. 
Id. at 49.  Thus, Indians without a certain amount of Indian blood quantum were deemed, 
essentially, white and without need of state assistance, while those with a high degree of 
Indian blood were deemed still Indian and, consequently, in need of paternalistic protection. 
 184. The 1887 General Allotment Act authorized the federal government to divide up 
communal Indian lands and give them to individual Indians. See Indian General Allotment 
(Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–358 
(2006)).  The alienability of an allotment possessed by a member of an Indian tribe depended 
on the blood quantum of the Indian who owned it. See Spruhan, supra note 180, at 40–41 
(describing how the Dawes Commission deemed allotment lands alienable or inalienable 
based on the blood quantum of the land’s owners). 
 185. See Spruhan, supra note 180, at 2 (“Classification as an Indian or non-Indian or a 
member Indian or non-member Indian is central to jurisdictional questions in Indian law, as 
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As many commentators have argued over the years, incorporating 
notions of blood quantum—and the corollary notion that biological race 
exists—into American Indian jurisprudence has the effect of producing law 
that is antithetical to American Indians’ interests.186  Arguably, however, 
the most evident demonstration of this “bad law” occurs in the context of 
determining which groups even qualify as tribes and, thus, are deserving of 
the benefits that accrue from that status. 
The Court’s decision in Montoya v. United States established the criteria 
for legal recognition as a “tribe,” finding that a tribe is “a body of Indians of 
the same or a similar race, united in a community under one leadership or 
government, and inhabiting a particular though sometimes ill-defined 
territory.”187  Thus, according to Montoya, a tribe has an element of racial 
similarity—racial purity.188  Groups without this requisite racial purity are 
not tribes, even though they may consider themselves as such. 
The unfortunate consequences of building a requirement of racial purity 
into the definition of tribe were illustrated in the case of the Mashpee Tribe, 
who sued the Town of Mashpee on Cape Cod, Massachusetts in order to 
reclaim lands that they had historically inhabited.189  The Mashpee Tribe 
claimed that their lands had been taken from them in violation of the Indian 
Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, which prohibits the sale of Indian lands to 
non-Indians without federal approval of the transfer.190  The Town of 
Mashpee, on the other hand, argued that the Mashpee Tribe was not a tribe 
under the current legal definition, and consequently, federal approval was 
not required prior to the transfer of their lands.191  Thus, it was necessary to 
determine whether the Mashpee Tribe was a legal tribe. 
The court determined it was not, in large part because the Mashpee 
lacked racial purity.192  During their long history, the Mashpee had 
 
both Congress and the Supreme Court demarcate federal, tribal and state authority on Indian 
lands based on an individual’s status.”).  Accordingly, there is a wealth of case law dealing 
with the question of whether a particular defendant possesses a sufficient blood quantum and 
a sufficient relationship to an Indian tribe to be considered Indian for the purposes of 
establishing jurisdiction in a criminal matter. See Lindsey Trainor Golden, Embracing Tribal 
Sovereignty To Eliminate Criminal Jurisdiction Chaos, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1039, 
1062–63 (2012) (discussing cases in which individuals with Indian blood quanta of forty-
five percent and four percent were found not to be Indian, and comparing these cases with 
others in which an individual with an Indian blood quantum of thirteen percent and an 
individual with an unknown Indian blood quantum were considered Indian). 
 186. See generally Golden, supra note 185; Spruhan, supra note 180. 
 187. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901). 
 188. Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnundio By Precedent and 
Evidence:  The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 634 (describing Montoya as 
“rooted in notions of racial purity”). 
 189. Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), aff’d sub 
nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 190. Mashpee Tribe, 592 F.2d at 579. 
 191. See id. at 581. 
 192. Pratt has argued that many Indian tribes attempted to protect their status as legally 
recognized tribes—and, therefore, sovereigns—by prohibiting Indians from marrying black 
individuals. 
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intermarried with white colonists, runaway black slaves, and Indians from 
other tribes.193  As a consequence, the Mashpee had become a “mixed race” 
of Indians.  That a group of Indians could be composed of individuals who 
are white, black, Native American, and various intermixtures of those three 
imagined originary races is a possibility that is incongruent to notions of 
biological race.  Further, it was a possibility that was specifically rejected 
by the definition of tribe announced in Montoya, which required that a tribe 
be composed of individuals of the “same or similar race.”194  Thus, despite 
the fact that the Mashpee Tribe considered themselves a tribe irrespective of 
their racial “intermixture,”195 the Town of Mashpee successfully defeated 
the Mashpee’s claim by arguing that they were not an Indian tribe protected 
by the Non-Intercourse Act, as “black intermarriage made the Mashpees’ 
proper racial identification black and not Indian.”196  It should be 
underscored that, if the Court rejected biological race when defining what it 
means to be an Indian or an Indian tribe, such statuses would depend on 
how individuals and groups define themselves and would produce more just 
results. 
In sum, American Indian law makes explicit the Court’s otherwise 
implicit acceptance of racial biology.  Title VII case law brings the Court’s 
commitment to this anachronistic idea into even greater relief. 
 
  The tribes probably understood that the willingness of the federal government 
and the states to recognize the tribes as “domestic dependent nations” was 
contingent upon the state and federal governments viewing them as groups of 
indigenous people—that is, racially Indian people.  The federal government 
recognized the sovereignty of Indian nations because, from its perspective, the 
tribes were a self-governing race of people who had existed in the Americas before 
European conquest. 
Carla D. Pratt, Loving Indian Style:  Maintaining Racial Caste and Tribal Sovereignty 
Through Sexual Assimilation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 409, 448.  Accordingly, many tribes 
protected their Indianness, which was intimately connected to their status as tribes and 
sovereign entities, by proscribing their members from marrying “outside of their race.”  She 
writes, “It is plausible that the tribes’ primary goal in enacting anti-black miscegenation laws 
was to protect the tribe’s racially Indian identity. . . .  Racial transformation of the tribe from 
Indian to Negro would have meant the loss of federal recognition, which entailed losing 
sovereignty.” Id. at 447–48.  The Mashpees demonstrate that these tribes were not at all 
incorrect in their valuation of the relationship between race and tribal status. 
 193. See Torres & Milun, supra note 188, at 638 (describing how the Mashpees had 
married white colonists, runaway slaves, and members of other Indian tribes). 
 194. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901) (“By a ‘tribe’ we understand a 
body of Indians of the same or a similar race . . . .”). 
 195. See Torres & Milun, supra note 188, at 638  (“What was clear to the Mashpee, if not 
to outside observers, was that this mixing did not dilute their tribal status because they did 
not define themselves according to racial type, but rather by membership in their 
community.”); see also Pratt, supra note 192, at 444 (“[R]acialization of Indian people 
further destabilize[s] tribal sovereignty by imposing an identity on indigenous people that 
they may not have chosen for themselves.”). 
 196. See Torres & Milun, supra note 188, at 650. 
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B.  Title VII, Language, Accents, and Discrimination on the Basis of 
National Origin 
There is a robust literature that analyzes claims alleging discrimination 
on the basis of national origin that are brought by employees who have been 
subjected to adverse employment actions because of language or accent.  
Many of the claims involve employees who were fired because they spoke 
Spanish at work, thus violating an employer’s English-only rule.197  There 
are also claims alleging that employees or potential employees were 
subjected to adverse employment actions because they spoke with 
accents.198  At present, plaintiffs typically lose these cases.  First, 
employers tend to succeed by arguing that they have legitimate business 
reasons for prohibiting employees from speaking other languages while at 
work, or for firing or refusing to hire a plaintiff because of an accent.199  
Second, courts tend to treat both a bilingual individual speaking a non-
English language and an individual speaking with an accent as 
demonstrating “preferences” that are “voluntary.”  Courts argue that Title 
 
 197. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding 
employer’s English-only policy because bilingual employees were capable of speaking 
English and Title VII’s ban on national origin discrimination is not properly interpreted as 
actively promoting cultural expression); Cosme v. Salvation Army, 284 F. Supp. 2d 229, 239 
(D. Mass. 2003) (holding that bilingual plaintiff who could speak English was not a victim 
of disparate treatment under Title VII on the basis of national origin when her supervisor 
requested that she refrain from speaking Spanish at work). 
 198. See, e.g., Fragante v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 595–99 (9th Cir. 
1989) (denying a Title VII national origin discrimination claim brought by a plaintiff who 
was not hired for a civil service job because he spoke with a “[h]eavy Filipino” accent, but 
stating that discrimination solely because of an employee’s or potential employee’s accent 
“does establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination”); Berke v. Ohio Dep’t of 
Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a prima face case of national 
origin discrimination can be established by alleging that an employee suffered an adverse 
employment action because he spoke with a “foreign” accent). See generally Mari J. 
Matsuda, Voices of America:  Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the 
Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (exploring Title VII case law involving 
accent discrimination). 
 199. See, e.g., Fragante, 888 F.2d at 597–99 (finding no Title VII discrimination based 
on national origin because the plaintiff’s Filipino accent made him hard to understand and 
his job required clear communication abilities); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270–71 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (finding that defendant’s English-only policy did not violate Title VII by 
discriminating against Mexican American plaintiffs on the basis of national origin because 
the rule was limited to the time when they were on the clock and fulfilled legitimate business 
necessities); Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Sys., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1334–35 
(D.N.M. 2005) (finding no Title VII national origin discrimination in an employer’s English-
only policy because it had a legitimate worry that employees were making derogatory 
remarks in Spanish); EEOC v. Teleservices Mktg. Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 724, 729 (E.D. 
Tex. 2005) (denying summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination based on 
national origin under Title VII after he was fired due to his Sudanese accent because there 
was a dispute over whether or not this accent made him unable to do his job); Prado v. L. 
Luria & Son, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1349, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (finding no Title VII 
discrimination based on national origin against a bilingual plaintiff because the defendant 
had a legitimate interest in trying to get employees to approach customers primarily in 
English). 
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VII is only concerned with protecting plaintiffs from discrimination based 
on “involuntary,” “immutable” characteristics.200 
This jurisprudence raises several questions, notably the question of why 
claims of language and accent discrimination are rarely alleged as a form of 
racial discrimination, despite Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on 
the basis of an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”201  
Rather, as noted above, plaintiffs usually argue that they were discriminated 
against on the basis of national origin.202  Moreover, courts,203 the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission204 (EEOC), and commentators 
within the academy205 tend to accept, without question, that language and 
 
 200. See, e.g., Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1987) (“An 
employer can properly enforce a limited, reasonable and business-related English-only rule 
against an employee who can readily comply with the rule and who voluntarily chooses not 
to observe it as ‘a matter of individual preference.’” (quoting Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270)); 
Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269 (“Save for religion, the discriminations on which the Act focuses its 
laser of prohibition are those that are . . . beyond the victim’s power to alter . . . .  No one can 
change his place of birth (national origin), the place of birth of his forebears (national 
origin), his race or fundamental sexual characteristics. . . .  ‘Equal employment opportunity 
may be secured only when employers are barred from discriminating against employees on 
the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national origin.’” (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975))). 
 201. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 202. Carlo A. Pedrioli, Respecting Language As Part of Ethnicity:  Title VII and 
Language Discrimination at Work, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 97, 100 (2011) 
(“Federal protection against language-based discrimination by employers frequently, 
although not always, comes under the national origin category in Title VII.”). 
 203. See, e.g., Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596 (“Accent and national origin are obviously 
inextricably intertwined in many cases.”). 
 204. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2012) (“The primary language of an individual is often 
an essential national origin characteristic.  Prohibiting employees at all times, in the 
workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language they speak most 
comfortably, disadvantages an individual’s employment opportunities on the basis of 
national origin.  It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation 
based on national origin which could result in a discriminatory working environment.” 
(emphasis added)).  Notably, courts have refused to accept the EEOC’s interpretation of 
Title VII. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Nothing 
in the plain language of [Title VII] supports [the] EEOC’s English-only rule Guideline.”). 
 205. Professor Rich’s insightful piece on this area of Title VII case law contains an 
interesting moment where she wrestles with the fact that language and accent discrimination 
cases tend to allege discrimination on the basis of national origin and not race.  She writes: 
For the purposes of this discussion, I recognize four races:  blacks, whites, Latinos, 
and Asians.  I recognize, however, that many ethnic groups cannot be assigned 
consistently to any of the four race categories.  For example, Filipinos are 
recognized variously as Latino or Asian.  Samoans also defy easy categorization.  
My decision to treat Latinos as a race may raise some concerns, particularly since 
Title VII claims brought by members of this “race” typically frame their claims as 
national origin claims, each concerning a specific Latin ethnicity. . . .  While 
recognizing these problems, I characterize Latinos as a racial group because much 
of their experience of discrimination in the United States is premised on stigmatic 
associations broadly attributed to a Latin identity, real or imagined. 
See Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity:  Discrimination by Proxy 
and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1146 n.31 (2004).  Professor Rich 
arrives at the same conclusion as this Article:  Latinos should be understood as a racial group 
because, when commitments to racial biology have been abandoned, one clearly sees that 
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accent discrimination, if cognizable under Title VII, is discrimination based 
on national origin and not race.206 
But what makes language and accent inherent characteristics of national 
origin but not of race?207  In truth, plaintiffs who are fired because they 
spoke Spanish at work or spoke with a Spanish accent are not terminated 
because they are from Mexico, or Cuba, or Spain; rather, they are fired 
because they spoke Spanish at work or spoke with a Spanish accent.  The 
offending characteristic or behavior is speaking a non-English language or 
speaking English with an accent, not the nation of origin.208  In fact, it is 
unclear that plaintiffs even have to allege that they were born in another 
country—that is, that they have a national origin other than the United 
States—in order to assert a claim of discrimination on the basis of national 
origin.209  Indeed, many plaintiffs who are victims of language or accent 
 
they constitute a race (when race is understood to index essentialized difference).  Professor 
Rich arrives at this conclusion, however, within a paradigm that appears to be modeled off of 
racial biology.  Namely, she believes that there can only be a handful of races.  Moreover, 
whites, blacks, and Asians are clearly races, while Latinos are only controversially so. 
 206. Professor Rich theorizes that the reason why plaintiffs seeking relief for 
discrimination on the basis of language and accent tend to claim that the relevant 
characteristic is their national origin, and not their race, is because these plaintiffs tend to 
belong to ethnic groups that have retained a distinct identity “independent of racial 
constructs.” See id. at 1204 n.265.  She concludes that “the main distinction between national 
origin cases and race cases is that the plaintiff in the national origin case can offer evidence 
which shows a tighter fit between a stereotype and her ethnic identity.” Id.  Thus, Rich can 
be read to argue that race discrimination claims involve a general “otherness,” while national 
origin discrimination claims involve a specific “otherness.”  But, this analysis just does not 
seem to be supported by the case law.  When plaintiffs allege national origin discrimination 
because they experienced an adverse employment action due to speaking Spanish or 
accented English, they do not claim that the Spanish they spoke was of a variety unique to a 
specific nation; neither do they claim that their accent clearly indexed that they belonged to a 
distinct country.  Instead, their claims tend to allege that they experienced discrimination 
because, in speaking a language other than English or in speaking English in a way that 
indicated that it was not their first language, they performed a general racial/ethnic 
otherness, i.e. not “white,” not “American.” 
 207. Notably, lower courts, when holding against plaintiffs claiming national origin 
discrimination after experiencing discrimination due to speaking a non-English language at 
work, have failed to find that language is a characteristic that inheres in national origin. See, 
e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268–69 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Neither the statute nor 
common understanding equates national origin with the language that one chooses to 
speak. . . .  National origin must not be confused with ethnic or sociocultural traits . . . .”). 
 208. See Perea, supra note 106, at 572–73 (“Most of the discrimination we currently label 
‘national origin’ discrimination is actually discrimination because of ethnic 
characteristics. . . .  To the extent that the current constitutional prohibition focuses on 
national origin, it misses the problem:  discrimination because of the ethnic characteristics of 
certain Americans.”). 
 209. See Pedrioli, supra note 202, at 108–09 (noting that a plaintiff claiming that he was 
discriminated against on the basis of national origin because he spoke a language other than 
English at work may have been born in the United States, asserting that “[c]laiming that one 
suffered discrimination because he or she was born in the United States does not make 
sense,” and concluding that the claim is only appropriate “when the employee was born in 
another country that does not have English as one of its major languages”). 
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discrimination were born in the United States.210  Professor Perea observes 
the discursive problem created by a doctrine that forces persons who are 
born in the United States to allege that they were discriminated against on 
the basis of their national origin in order to be protected from what is, 
essentially, racial discrimination.  He notes, “Such individuals must deny 
their actual national origin, the United States . . . .  [E]thnically different 
Americans must claim a treacherous fiction, that they belong to another 
country, in order to fit a . . . recognized category of claims.”211 
This Article suggests that the reason why language and accent fail to be 
understood as racial characteristics and are, instead, (somewhat illogically) 
construed as characteristics indexing a national origin, is because the case 
law is built on the assumption that race is biologically based.  Because 
biological race is the racial paradigm that lower courts212 embrace in these 
cases, and because no one seriously argues (anymore)213 that one’s 
language is rooted in one’s biology, then courts214 do not cognize language 
and accent discrimination as racial discrimination. 
The accuracy of this analysis of language and accent discrimination cases 
is made apparent when one considers Title VII cases involving 
discrimination on the basis of a plaintiff’s hairstyle.  These hair-related 
cases, typically involving employers’ grooming codes, invariably are 
understood to concern questions of race and not national origin.215  It is 
 
 210. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Requirement That Employees Speak English 
in Workplace As Violative of Federal Constitutional and Statutory Law, 24 A.L.R. FED. 2d 
587, 603 (2008) (discussing a language discrimination case where “[t]he plaintiffs were two 
American-born bilingual medical assistants” subjected to an English-only policy). 
 211. See Perea, supra note 106, at 578. 
 212. The Supreme Court has never heard a language or accent discrimination case. See 
Pedrioli, supra note 202, at 103 (noting the lack of Court precedent on language 
discrimination and the resultant necessity for the lower courts to develop case law in this 
area). 
 213. See, e.g., United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206 (1923) (noting in the syllabus to 
the opinion the defense counsel’s argument that “[i]t has been pointed out by many scholars 
that identity of language does not necessarily prove identity of blood, for ordinarily anyone 
can learn a foreign language.”); see also Braman, supra note 20, at 1411 (noting the idea in 
older anthropology that there was “organic unity” among race, language, and culture). 
 214. The EEOC, although disagreeing with lower courts inasmuch as it interprets Title 
VII to protect plaintiffs from accent discrimination, agrees with lower courts inasmuch as it 
considers accents to be a matter of national origin and not race. See Matsuda, supra note 
198, at 1348. 
 215. Like plaintiffs asserting discrimination on the basis of language or accent, plaintiffs 
asserting discrimination on the basis of hairstyle tend to lose their claims.  Paradigmatic of 
these cases is Rogers v. American Airlines, involving a black woman plaintiff who claimed 
racial discrimination under Title VII after her employer informed her that the cornrows in 
which she wore her hair violated the grooming policy. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  
The court held in the employer’s favor, noting that the grooming code did not “regulate on 
the basis of any immutable characteristic of the employees involved.” Id. at 231.  Arguing 
that Title VII allowed discrimination on the basis of “mutable” characteristics (like the 
braids in which one wears one’s hair) while prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
“immutable” characteristics (like the texture of one’s hair), the Southern District of New 
York noted that a grooming policy that disallowed black employees from wearing their hair 
in an “Afro/bush style” may be illegal under Title VII. Id. at 232.  The court explained that 
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easy to understand why.  First, plaintiffs bringing these cases tend to be 
black, and the hairstyles that are the subjects of the disputes typically tend 
to be worn by other black persons.216  Because black people historically 
have been thought to comprise a racial category, it is not difficult for courts 
to cognize discrimination against them—or against a characteristic that is 
asserted to be unique to them—as racial discrimination. 
Second, hair (and its texture) has often been thought to be one of the 
primary indicators of race, along with skin color, nose width, lip size, and 
eye shape.217  According to racial typologies, members of the black race 
have kinky or tightly curled hair; members of the Asian (or Malay) race 
have straight, black hair; and members of the white race have “flowing” 
hair.218  Moreover, it was thought that the biological distinctiveness of the 
racial groups produced the distinctiveness in hair textures, colors, and 
characteristics.219  Thus, it should come as no surprise that courts, 
 
this “would be because banning a natural hairstyle would implicate the policies underlying 
the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics.” Id.  Unlike an 
Afro, cornrows and braids are “not the product of natural hair growth but of artifice.  An all-
braided hair style is an easily changed characteristic.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  Where courts in language and accent discrimination cases tend to hold that the 
“voluntary” nature of a language or accent “preference” justifies withholding Title VII 
protection, courts in hairstyle discrimination cases tend to hold that the “mutability” of a 
chosen hairstyle justifies withholding Title VII protection. See Rich, supra note 205, at 
1225–26. 
 216. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding a 
grooming policy that banned the plaintiff’s dreadlocks against his Title VII race 
discrimination claim because he failed to show the policy applied unequally based on race); 
Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *6 (M.D. Ga. 
Apr. 25, 2008) (finding no violation of Title VII due to racial discrimination in a policy that 
banned “Afrocentric” hairstyles because the plaintiff’s choice to wear cornrow braids was 
not an immutable characteristic); Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264–
65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (upholding a policy banning “unconventional hairstyles” that led to the 
firing of an African American plaintiff who wore his hair in dreadlocks because he failed to 
prove the policy was racially motivated, a requirement for Title VII race discrimination 
claims); McPherson v. Shoney’s Colonial, Inc., No. 95-0069-C, 1996 WL 684437, at *3 
(W.D. Va. Nov. 21, 1996) (rejecting an African American plaintiff’s claim of Title VII race 
discrimination after her employer informed her she could no longer wear her hair in a 
braided style because she failed to show the employer acted with deliberate intention of 
having her quit); Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 (finding no Title VII racial discrimination 
against an African American plaintiff in a policy prohibiting all braided hairstyles because 
braids are not “worn exclusively or even predominantly” by African Americans). 
 217. Devin D. Collier, Don’t Get It Twisted:  Why Employer Hairstyle Prohibitions Are 
Racially Discriminatory, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 33, 49–50 (2012) (describing 
how skin color is typically indicative of race, but when it is not definitive, a social “hair test” 
can be applied to visually gauge a person’s race). 
 218. See JORDAN, supra note 26, at 221 (citing Linnaeus’s description of the hair types 
possessed by various races). 
 219. In an instructive article, Professor Onwuachi-Willig argues that courts ought to 
recognize as racial discrimination employers’ penalizing black employees for wearing their 
hair in styles that employers believe violate their grooming codes. See generally Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece:  Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 
98 GEO. L.J. 1079 (2010).  While conceding that race is socially constructed, she 
nevertheless makes an argument that is based on the biological distinctiveness of many black 
people’s tightly curled/kinky hair and the amenability of that texture to certain hairstyles for 
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proceeding from the baseline assumption that biological race exists, and 
that hair is an indicator of the biological race to which an individual 
belongs, would unquestioningly assume that discrimination on the basis of 
hairstyle is a question of race. 
It does not necessarily follow, however, that only discrimination on the 
basis of biological characteristics is likely to be understood as racial 
discrimination.  It is likely that courts could understand nonbiological 
characteristics as racial characteristics.  For example, if a black person is 
discriminated against because he listens to hip hop music, a court may 
interpret that discrimination as racial discrimination because hip hop is 
associated with black people—although listening to hip hop is clearly not a 
biological characteristic.  Because of courts’ underlying commitment to 
racial biology, however, this discrimination would be understood as racial 
discrimination because it was practiced against a black person, an 
individual who falls neatly within schematizations of biological race.  
Importantly, the thrust of this Article is to underscore that if, for example, a 
Dominican person is discriminated against because he listens to bachata 
music, a court will likely understand this as discrimination on the basis of 
national origin, although the Dominican victim might have been born and 
bred in the United States.  Courts would be led to conclude that this 
discrimination is national origin discrimination because Dominicans do not 
comfortably fit within schemas of biological race.  Scholarship that has 
analyzed whether Title VII should protect persons who speak “black 
English” from adverse employment actions demonstrates that this is the 
correct analysis of the issue.  This form of language discrimination is 
invariably understood as racial discrimination—likely because it concerns 
discrimination against a characteristic that is construed as unique to black 
people.220 
Finally, it is also possible that the Title VII case law does not reflect the 
courts’ understanding of race.  Instead, it might be said that the case law 
reflects the racial worldview of the common discriminator.  In other words, 
in the dialectical relationship between law and culture, perhaps it is not the 
law that has originated this understanding of race—instead, it might be said 
that the law is merely reflecting a culture that assumes the truth of 
biological race.  That is, because the common discriminator believes that 
black people comprise a race, then discrimination against black people is 
racial discrimination under Title VII.  Similarly, because the common 
discriminator believes that, for example, a person is Mexican even though 
 
which black female plaintiffs have been penalized, such as cornrows, braids, locks, and 
twists. See id. at 1103 (“What antidiscrimination law needs is for lawyers and courts to make 
explicit this understanding of race as a social construct and extend such racialized analysis 
for the protection of the Afro hairstyle—which is based on biology—to braids, locks, and 
twists for black women.”). 
 220. See, e.g., Jill Gaulding, Against Common Sense:  Why Title VII Should Protect 
Speakers of Black English, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 637, 637 (1998) (“[E]mployers who 
reject Black English speakers because of their speech patterns are in fact violating Title VII’s 
prohibition against race discrimination.”). 
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he may have been born in the United States and may have never even been 
to Mexico, then discrimination against that person is discrimination on the 
basis of national origin under Title VII.  Consequently, an analogy may be 
drawn between this context and that of Thind where the Court held that 
“white person” within the Naturalization Act should be defined in 
accordance with ordinary conceptions of race.221  To the extent that the law 
reflects the racial assumptions possessed by the common discriminator, 
then the law reflects the belief that biological race exists.  This is because 
the common discriminator likely has not been disabused of the notion that 
racial biology is real. 
1.  Language As a Racial Characteristic:  Hernandez v. New York 
When the Court has addressed the issue of discrimination on the basis of 
language outside of the Title VII context, it has interpreted it as a racial 
characteristic.  Consider Hernandez v. New York,222 an equal protection 
case concerning a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to strike 
Latino persons from a jury.223  The prosecutor claimed that he did this 
because an interpreter was going to translate the testimony of Spanish-
speaking witnesses during the trial, and the prosecutor was afraid that 
Spanish-speaking jurors would be unable to ignore the witnesses’ direct 
speech and accept, as final, the translator’s interpretation of the 
testimony.224  The Court held that the prosecutor had offered a “race-
neutral” explanation for striking the Latino jurors, thus denying the equal 
protection challenge.225 
The Court, consistent with its approach throughout much of its 
jurisprudence, appears to use race as a legal term of art, allowing race to 
denote groups of individuals united not by biology, but rather because of 
social, political, cultural, and historical reasons—which the Court uses the 
 
 221. See supra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text. 
 222. 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
 223. Id. at 355–56. 
 224. Id. at 356–57.  Jurors had been questioned as to whether they could accept the 
interpreter’s translation of the Spanish testimony, and they had hesitated before offering an 
answer in the affirmative; after the defense attorney raised a Batson objection to the 
challenges, the prosecutor explained, 
I didn’t feel, when I asked them whether or not they could accept the interpreter’s 
translation of it, I didn’t feel that they could.  They each looked away from me and 
said with some hesitancy that they would try, not that they could, but that they 
would try to follow the interpreter, and I feel that in a case where the interpreter 
will be for the main witnesses, they would have an undue impact upon the jury. 
Id. 
 225. Id. at 361. (“The prosecutor here offered a race-neutral basis for these peremptory 
strikes.  As explained by the prosecutor, the challenges rested neither on the intention to 
exclude Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on stereotypical assumptions about Latinos or 
bilinguals.”).  The Court admitted that striking jurors because they spoke Spanish would 
have a disparate impact on Latinos; however, discriminatory intent, not simply disparate 
impact, has to be proven in order to sustain an equal protection challenge. See id. at 360 
(citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
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term “ethnicity” to encompass.226  This is illustrated by the Court’s framing 
of the question before it: 
Petitioner Dionisio Hernandez asks us to review the New York state 
courts’ rejection of his claim that the prosecutor in his criminal trial 
exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Latinos from the jury by 
reason of their ethnicity. . . .  We must determine whether the prosecutor 
offered a race-neutral basis for challenging Latino potential jurors . . . .227 
The petitioner claimed that the jurors were struck from the jury because 
of their ethnicity; the Court queried whether a race-neutral reason had been 
given.  In essence, the Court appears to use “race” and “ethnicity” 
interchangeably. 
Moreover, the Court clearly understands that language may be a racial 
characteristic in some contexts: 
In holding that a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge means a 
reason other than race, we do not resolve the more difficult question of 
the breadth with which the concept of race should be defined for equal 
protection purposes.  We would face a quite different case if the 
prosecutor had justified his peremptory challenges with the explanation 
that he did not want Spanish-speaking jurors.  It may well be, for certain 
ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular 
language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under 
an equal protection analysis.228 
The Court appears to be aware that there is a close relationship between 
language and race.  The Court knows that in some contexts, a class will 
consist mostly, or entirely, of persons of a certain race if the class has been 
defined by its members’ relationship to a language.  Thus, in Atlanta, 
Georgia, for example, a class will consist mostly of Latino persons if 
“Spanish-speakers” is the characteristic that defines the group.  The same 
 
 226. Professor Perea makes this observation with respect to the Court’s jurisprudence 
generally, but he argues that using “race” to denote “ethnicity” is wrong and confusing, as he 
considers the terms distinct. See Perea, supra note 106, at 572 (“Although the Court has 
recently referred to a constitutional prohibition against discrimination because of ethnicity or 
language, the Court seems to be using the term ‘ethnicity’ as part of its unclear conception of 
‘race.’  The Court’s language reveals and creates confusion and obscures discrimination.”). 
 227. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355.  Professor Oquendo takes note of this language and 
accuses the Court of confusing “race” and “ethnicity.”  He writes, 
If the Court is considering potential discrimination because of ethnicity, as the 
plurality appears to recognize, then it should be determining whether the 
prosecutor’s reason was ‘ethnicity-neutral,’ not ‘race-neutral.’  This distinction is 
more than a semantic difference because many reasons that can be deemed ‘race-
neutral’—meaning ‘not race’—such as bilingualism, accent, or Latino surname, 
may not be ‘ethnicity-neutral.’ 
Oquendo, supra note 65, at 596.  However, the tension that Professor Oquendo perceives in 
the Court’s usage of “ethnicity” and “race” neutrality is resolved when one understands the 
Court as using “race” as a legal term of art that indexes both “race” and “ethnicity.”  
Moreover, it reveals Professor Oquendo’s own commitment to racial biology, a commitment 
that allows him to recognize race in only those characteristics of a person that bear on their 
biological composition. 
 228. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371. 
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would not be true in other places—like Miami, Florida, or New York City, 
for example, where many non-Latino persons speak Spanish.  In the Atlanta 
example, language proficiency would have acted as a “surrogate of race,” 
allowing the person that is defining the class to speak about and manipulate 
race without mentioning it explicitly. 
The Court’s reference to skin color, however, deserves a little more 
exploration.  Essentially, the Court states that, like language proficiency, 
skin color may be treated as a “surrogate for race.”229  At first blush, this is 
a peculiar argument, if only because skin color has been widely thought to 
be one of the defining characteristics of racial groups:  black persons have 
dark skin, white persons have light skin, and Asians and Native Americans 
have skin colors somewhere in between.  Indeed, in the past, the races were 
referenced by skin color:  black, white, red, and yellow.230  Yet a brief 
glance across a racially diverse classroom, for example, reveals this to be a 
gross simplification of the truth:  many black persons have skin that is fairer 
than many white persons, while the skin colors of Asian and Native 
American persons fall at all points along the spectrum.231  Thus, perhaps the 
Court’s statement is not peculiar at all.  The color of a person’s skin does 
not determine the racial group to which she has been ascribed or with which 
she identifies; it operates alongside other characteristics (i.e., parents’ racial 
identification/ascription, socioeconomic class, the country of birth, etc.) in 
defining a person’s racial status.  Therefore, only in certain contexts will a 
class consist mostly or entirely of people of one race if the class has been 
defined by its members’ skin color.  In effect, the Court notes that skin 
color is not race; it could, however, be a proxy for race. 
It is worth leaving open the possibility that the Court is calling upon 
biological race here, however.  That is, it would not be unreasonable to 
wonder whether the Court, consistent with its jurisprudence generally, is 
proceeding from the assumption that biological race exists.  Thus, skin 
color can only be a surrogate for race because the color of one’s skin does 
not necessarily reveal the racial truths that are contained in the genes.  The 
racial status that a person inhabits by virtue of her skin color (operating 
together with the racial identification/ascription of her parents, her class, her 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. For example, the lyrics to the popular children’s song “Jesus Loves the Little 
Children” include: 
Jesus loves the little children, 
All the children of the world. 
Red and yellow, black and white, 
All are precious in His sight, 
Jesus loves the little children of the world. 
C. H. Wolston & George F. Root, Jesus Loves the Little Children, in THE LIBRARY OF 
HYMNS 211 (Wayne Yankie ed., 2006). 
 231. See Am. Anthropological Ass’n, The Human Spectrum:  Where Do You Draw the 
Line?, RACE:  ARE WE SO DIFFERENT?, http://www.understandingrace.org/humvar/
spectrum.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
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country of birth, etc.) can only be a “surrogate” for her race—that is, the 
“real” race that is revealed when her biology is investigated. 
Finally, it deserves mention that the Court has to divorce Spanish-
speaking ability from being Latino in order to find that the prosecutor gave 
a “race-neutral” reason for striking Latino jurors.   That is, if speaking 
Spanish were considered part and parcel of being Latino, then striking a 
juror because he speaks Spanish would be equivalent to striking a juror 
because he is Latino.  The Court rejects this simultaneity, and rightly so:  
one can be Latino without knowing how to speak Spanish.232  The logic of 
the approach is inconsistent, however, with the logic that courts use with 
language discrimination cases in the Title VII context. Courts in these 
cases, framed as questions of national origin discrimination, characterize 
speaking a language as part and parcel of “originating” in another nation.  
Thus, firing an employee because she speaks Spanish at work is constructed 
as equivalent to firing the employee because she is from a Spanish-speaking 
country.  There is, therefore, a strange inconsistency between lower courts’ 
approach to language ability in the Title VII national origin discrimination 
context and the Court’s approach to language ability in Hernandez v. New 
York. 
2.  Language and Accents Are Racial Characteristics, of Course 
Using the definition of race that this Article offers,233 one can easily see 
that language and accent discrimination are racial discrimination without 
having to rely on some definition of race as ethnicity.  When race is 
acknowledged as an entirely pragmatic entity that indexes essentialized 
difference while having no actual relationship to biology, then one can 
appreciate language as a racial trait.  If Spanish-speaking groups (i.e., 
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Latinos) are as much races as are white and black 
people, then differences in language are just as racial as differences in skin 
color, nose width, lip size, and hair texture.  It bears noting that the 
incomprehension of the words that a person speaks—indeed, failing to 
recognize as words that which a person speaks, and hearing only a 
rhythmical cadence—may be thought to demonstrate the radical difference 
between the hearer and the speaker.234  Language difference may make it 
 
 232. See Cameron, supra note 76, at 1364 (“But Latinos, whether fluent Spanish speakers 
or not, all have some common connection with the [Spanish] language.  If we do not speak it 
ourselves, then it is the language of our ancestors.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also 
Tracy López, Non-Spanish Fluent Latinas:  “Don’t Judge Us,” NEW LATINA (March 9, 
2012), http://newlatina.net/non-fluent-latinas-dont-judge-us/; Carolina Moreno, Latinos Not 
Speaking Spanish, Does That Makes Someone A “Fake” Hispanic?, HUFFINGTON POST  
(Sept. 17, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/17/latinos-not-speaking-
spanish_n_1890501.html; Raul A. Reyes, Opinion:  Not Speaking Spanish Doesn’t Make 
You Less Latino, NBCLATINO (Sept. 10, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://nbclatino.com/2012/09/10/
opinion-not-speaking-spanish-doesnt-make-you-less-latino/. 
 233. See supra Part I.B. 
 234. Cf. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371 (“Just as shared language can serve to foster 
community, language differences can be a source of division.  Language elicits a response 
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impossible (or, at least, extremely difficult) to reconcile other apparent 
differences between two persons.  Moreover, there should be no doubt that 
groups that speak different languages are essentialized because of this 
difference.  Speaking a non-English language identifies a person with a 
group—a group that is heterogeneous, but whose heterogeneity is denied by 
its construction as a homogeneous group, i.e., Latino, Mexican, Dominican. 
Finally, Spanish, or any non-English, proficiency does not identify a 
person with any particular nation; rather, within a particular racial logic, it 
disidentifies that person from the United States.235  Moreover, when 
(United States) “Americanness” and racialized whiteness are understood as 
simultaneous,236 then a disidentification from Americanness is a 
disidentification from whiteness.237  Accordingly, discriminating against a 
 
from others, ranging from admiration and respect, to distance and alienation, to ridicule and 
scorn.  Reactions of the latter type all too often result from or initiate racial hostility.”). 
 235. Philip C. Aka, Lucinda M. Deason, & Augustine Hammond, Measuring the Impact 
of Political Ideology on the Adoption of English-Only Laws in the United States, 13 
SCHOLAR 1, 14 (2010) (attributing English-only laws to xenophobia and noting that such 
laws are more likely to be passed in states with high populations of foreign-born residents or 
residents whose first language is not English).  Indeed, if one only scratches the surface of 
English-only movements, one can see the racism undergirding them. See Matsuda, supra 
note 198, at 1397 (“The recent push for English-only laws, and the attack on bilingual 
education, may represent new outlets for racial anxiety now that many traditional outlets are 
denied.  The angry insistence that ‘they’ should speak English serves as a proxy for a whole 
range of fears displaced by the social opprobrium directed at explicit racism.”). 
 236. See BRIDGES, supra note 69, at 219–20 (discussing the relationship between 
“Americanness” and racialized whiteness); NICHOLAS DE GENOVA & ANA Y. RAMOS-ZAYAS, 
LATINO CROSSINGS:  MEXICANS, PUERTO RICANS, AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND 
CITIZENSHIP 78 (2003) (“[N]either for African Americans nor for Puerto Ricans does 
birthright U.S. citizenship secure the status of ‘American’-ness, which constitutes a national 
identity that is understood, in itself, to be intrinsically racialized—as White.”).  Professor 
Matsuda discusses a Wall Street Journal article exploring “accent reduction schools,” which 
market themselves as essential to the success of persons “whose careers have stalled because 
of thick accents, even though their grammar and vocabulary skills are good.” Matsuda, supra 
note 198, at 1365 n.138.  She quotes the article, which contends that “[s]ometimes an 
American inflection is necessary not because of clarity, but because listeners tune out what 
they don’t like” and quotes a communications consultant who argues that “‘Americans have 
difficulty listening’ to Asian and Latin accents.” Id.  She observes, “Note that in these 
statements, ‘American’ means white.” Id. 
  W.E.B. Du Bois eloquently described the simultaneity of Americanness and 
racialized whiteness in The Souls of Black Folk.  In his description of the double 
consciousness, he argues that black people in the United States are always aware of their 
“two-ness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two 
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn 
asunder.” W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 11 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. & Terri 
Hume Oliver eds., W.W. Norton & Co. 1999) (1903).  That the “Negro” identification of the 
“American Negro” is at war with the “American” portion of her identification is due to the 
fact that “American” and “Americanness” are associated with racialized whiteness.  Thus, 
the “American Negro,” whose U.S. citizenship is her birthright, is produced as the unity of 
antithetical poles—that is, “Americanness,” and a “Blackness” that negates it.  In light of the 
simultaneity of “Americanness” and whiteness, “American Negro” reveals itself to be an 
oxymoron, according to DuBois. 
 237. However, Americanness does not constitute the entire universe of whiteness; there 
are other universes of whiteness that exist simultaneously with Americanness.  For example, 
being European is certainly an avenue for accessing whiteness.  Consequently, Europeans’ 
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person because there is some distance between her and a white racial 
status—that is, because she is not white—is racial discrimination.  A 
rejection of racial biology allows one to see this argument. 
Similarly, accents are as much a racial trait as language.  Discussions of 
race and racial discrimination inevitably erupt from discussions of accents 
and accent discrimination, tending to evidence that the concepts share a 
similar logic.  Consider Matsuda’s discussion of Kahakua v. Friday.238  The 
case involved a plaintiff who sued the National Weather Service under Title 
VII, claiming that, because he spoke with a Hawaiian accent, he was not 
hired as a meteorologist to issue weather reports on the radio.239  Matsuda 
writes that, after losing the job to a less-qualified candidate who did not 
speak with an accent, Kahakua thought to sue because he sensed that he had 
been “passed over because he didn’t sound white.”240  Note that Matsuda 
describes Kahakua’s accent in relationship to whiteness—clearly a racial 
term.241 
Just as speaking a language other than English disidentifies a person from 
Americanness, and, ultimately, from racialized whiteness,242 speaking with 
a non-English accent performs the same work and, as such, racializes a 
person as nonwhite.  Thus, accent discrimination is understood properly as 
racial discrimination.  Nevertheless, discrimination because an employee or 
potential employee spoke with an accent is understood by courts as national 
origin discrimination under Title VII.  Again, this is due to courts’, and 
scholars’, continuing assumption that race has some relationship to biology.  
Because a person’s accent clearly has no relationship to his biological 
constitution, most refuse to appreciate it as a racial characteristic.243 
In summary, this Article agrees with other scholars who have argued that 
Latinos generally, and subsets of Latinos (i.e., Mexicans), ought to be 
understood as “races,” both inside and outside of law.244  However, this 
Article diverges from the literature by refusing to argue that a shared 
 
disidentification from Americanness does not constitute a disidentification from whiteness, 
as they have access to the whiteness that comes with being European. 
 238. 876 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Matsuda, supra note 198, at 1345 (emphasis added). 
 241. Nevertheless, the thrust of her argument is that he should have succeeded in his suit 
because accent discrimination ought to be recognized as national origin discrimination.  See 
id. at 1349 (“[D]iscrimination against accent is the functional equivalent of discrimination 
against foreign origin.”). 
 242. See supra notes 235–37 and accompanying text. 
 243. Indeed, the district court that first heard the Kahakua case appeared to accept the 
logic that race concerns biology and, because one’s accent has no relationship to one’s 
biology, accent discrimination is not racial discrimination. See Kahakua v. Hallgren, No. 86-
0434, slip op. at 23 (D. Haw. 1987) (“[T]here is no race or physiological reason why 
Kahakua could not have used standard English pronunciations.” (emphasis added)), aff’d sub 
nom. Kahakua v. Friday, 876 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1989).  That race is paired with physiology, 
a branch of biology concerning the bodily functions of living organisms, suggests that the 
District of Hawaii believes that race has some relationship to biology. 
 244. See, e.g., Oquendo, supra note 65, at 94 (arguing that Latino/as ought to be 
considered a race). 
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“culture”245 or shared biology246 makes a race out of Latinos.  Instead, 
Latinos are a racial group because they are imagined as such—and are 
treated as such.  When they stop being imagined and treated as a race, then 
they will cease to be a race.247  This is the pragmatism of race—shifting, 
serving needs, disappearing, and being reconstituted in different forms.248 
3.  Making a Difference:  The Salutary Consequences of Reconceptualizing 
Language and Accent As Racial Characteristics Under Title VII 
Understanding language and accent as racial characteristics is useful not 
simply because it accurately reflects what race is.  This is because race is 
not a concept that indexes biologically distinct sets of homo sapiens, but 
rather is a tool that is deployed to construct essentialized, mutually 
exclusive groups of people.  Conceptualizing language and accent as racial 
characteristics is also useful because it may make a difference for plaintiffs 
suing employers under Title VII.  As noted above, plaintiffs generally lose 
when they challenge employer practices that penalize them for speaking 
with an accent or speaking a language other than English in the 
workplace.249  It is possible that a reconceptualization of language and 
accent as racial characteristics, however, could produce different results in 
litigation. 
With respect to accent discrimination cases, plaintiffs usually bring these 
cases under the disparate treatment prong of Title VII after an employer, 
due to the plaintiff’s accent, refused to hire or promote them.250  The 
 
 245. See, e.g., id. at 101 (arguing that, while there are “infinite gradations of color” 
among Puerto Ricans, “there is a single Afro-Antillean ethos”). 
 246. See, e.g., id. at 105 (arguing that Latinos “physiognomically resemble each other” 
and, therefore, could be understood as a race).  That Professor Oquendo understands 
“physiognomy” as biology is demonstrated when he talks about Mexicans as being a 
composite of the “physiognomic” influences supplied by Europe, Africa, and indigenous 
peoples. See id. at 100 (noting that “the main physiognomic influences” among Mexicans 
“are not even African and European” but rather the “indigenous peoples who populated the 
southern tip and southwest region of North America”). 
 247. Cf. Haney López, supra note 66, at 1163 (referencing Hernandez v. Texas and 
observing that the Court’s “opinion offered a sophisticated insight into the nature of race:  
whether a racial group exists is always a local question to be answered in terms of 
community attitudes”). 
 248. See generally Omi & Winant, supra note 65, at 4 (describing the theory of racial 
formation as one that “emphasizes the social nature of race, the absence of any essential 
racial characteristics, the historical flexibility of racial meanings and categories, . . . and the 
irreducible political aspect of racial dynamics”). 
 249. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 250. See, e.g., Fragante v. Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1989) (alleging disparate 
treatment after plaintiff was not hired due to his accent); Kahakua v. Hallgren, No. 86-0434, 
slip op. at 23 (D. Haw. 1987) (same), aff’d sub nom. Kahakua v. Friday, 876 F.2d 896 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
  There are two possible avenues that plaintiffs may pursue in Title VII cases:  
disparate treatment and disparate impact. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78 
(2009) (explaining that while Title VII has always prohibited disparate treatment on the basis 
of protected statuses, the disparate impact prohibition came later).  Disparate treatment 
occurs when an employer has “treated [a] particular person less favorably than others.” 
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justification that employers usually offer for the adverse employment action 
is that a plaintiff’s accent made it difficult or impossible for him to do the 
job.251  The argument is that, essentially, the accent rendered them 
unqualified.252  A serious commitment to the notion that race is a social 
construction with no biological moorings, however, allows for the 
recognition that race is much broader than what the Title VII case law 
presently recognizes it to be.  At this time, the Title VII case law 
understands race to be a complex of immutable, biologically based 
characteristics.253 Inasmuch as a person’s accent is not thought to be 
immutable or based in biology, it is not considered a racial characteristic.254  
Yet, the lesson of history is that race is actually a complex of constantly 
shifting traits that are used to identify a group that needs to be distinguished 
from others.255  Sometimes the traits that indicate race are immutable—like 
skin color, hair texture, and the width of one’s nose.  At other times, the 
traits that indicate race are mutable—like religion, style of dress, musical 
preferences, accent, or language.  Understood in this way, accent is a racial 
characteristic. 
Thus, when an employer refuses to promote or hire a plaintiff because 
she speaks with an accent associated with a group that society, history, and 
pragmatism have distinguished from others, that employer has treated the 
plaintiff differently because of her race.  Differently stated:  if accents are 
racial characteristics, then failing to hire someone because she speaks with 
an accent is equivalent to failing to hire her because she has dark skin, 
kinky hair, or a wide nose.  This is a textbook case of disparate treatment 
 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988).  Plaintiffs in these cases 
must prove that the employer acted with discriminatory intent. Id. at 986.  In contrast, 
plaintiffs do not have to prove discriminatory intent when proceeding under the disparate 
impact prong, but only have to demonstrate that a practice disproportionately affects a 
protected group and that there is no business necessity for the practice. See Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 251. See Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596–97 (“An adverse employment decision may be 
predicated upon an individual’s accent when—but only when—it interferes materially with 
job performance.  There is nothing improper about an employer making an honest 
assessment of the oral communications skills of a candidate for a job when such skills are 
reasonably related to job performance.”). 
 252. See id. at 598 (affirming the lower court’s finding that the plaintiff’s accent made it 
difficult for him to communicate effectively, and finding that an inability to communicate 
effectively is a “valid ground for finding a job applicant not qualified”). 
 253. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding 
the defendant’s policy prohibiting the wearing of braided hairstyles against a Title VII 
challenge because the policy “does not regulate on the basis of any immutable characteristic 
of the employees involved”); see also Rich, supra note 205, at 1228 (noting that in Title VII 
cases, courts frequently assume that “protected traits are only those that one possesses by 
accident of birth . . . and cannot change,” thereby making immutability their focus). 
 254. Matsuda, supra note 198, at 1400–01 (noting that accents may be mutable, but also 
arguing that an alternative interpretation of Title VII—one that courts have not embraced—
would make the statute capable of striking down rules that burden employees for having 
even mutable characteristics like accents). 
 255. See supra Part I.B. 
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under Title VII.256  Moreover, the employer cannot argue that it is a bona 
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) of the job to belong to a certain race 
(i.e., to speak without a racially salient accent) because, under Title VII, 
race may never be a BFOQ.257 
An employer who refuses to promote or hire an individual because her 
accent truly impedes job performance is not refusing to promote an 
individual because she speaks with an accent that is associated with a group 
that society, history, and pragmatism have distinguished from others.  
Instead, the employer’s action has everything to do with the plaintiff’s 
inability to do the job effectively and nothing to do at all with the plaintiff’s 
race.  Thus, there is no need for the employer to argue (unsuccessfully) that 
belonging to a certain race (i.e., speaking without an accent) is a BFOQ 
because, in this instance, there is no action on the basis of race. 
Of course, in many cases, it will be difficult for factfinders to determine 
the basis of an employer’s actions; that is, it will be unclear whether an 
employer has refused to hire or promote a plaintiff because his accent 
identifies him with a racialized group or because his accent impeded job 
performance.  It will be easier to prove that the employer discriminated on 
the basis of race where it is clear that the plaintiff’s accent did not make his 
speech difficult to understand,258 as well as where the job does not require 
customers or coworkers to understand the employee’s speech.  It will also 
be easier to prove unlawful discrimination where an employer has hired 
many other employees who speak with accents, but their accents identify 
them with a more racially privileged group than the plaintiff’s.259  
Nonetheless, even in the hard cases, factfinders should be empowered to 
find that accent discrimination is racial discrimination—a finding that the 
Title VII jurisprudence currently precludes. 
The same analytic applies to language discrimination cases, although it 
may be more difficult for plaintiffs to win in this context.  Plaintiffs usually 
bring language discrimination cases under the disparate impact prong of 
 
 256. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) 
(“‘Disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination.  The 
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
 257. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) (Title VII’s “bona fide occupational 
qualification” exception applies to all Title VII bases except race and color). 
 258. For example, Professor Matsuda notes that during the Fragante v. City and County 
of Honolulu trial,  
Mr. Fragante testified for two days, under the stress of both direct and cross-
examination.  The judge and the examiners spoke to Fragante in English and 
understood his answers.  A court reporter understood and took down his words 
verbatim.  In the functional context of the trial, everyone understood Manuel 
Fragante’s speech.  Yet the defendant’s interviewers continued to claim Fragante 
could not be understood well enough to serve as a DMV clerk.  
See Matsuda, supra note 198, at 1338. 
 259. For example, the existing employees’ Spanish accents, read together with other 
racial characteristics (i.e., style of dress, the music that they listen to, etc.), might racialize 
them as “Argentinian” or “Spaniards”; meanwhile, the plaintiff’s accent, read together with 
other racial characteristics, might racialize him as “Mexican” or “Dominican.” 
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Title VII after an employer institutes an English-only rule260 or has fired a 
plaintiff for violating an English-only rule.261  The justification that 
employers usually offer for instituting English-only rules is that they are 
designed to alleviate tensions among employees, who may feel that their 
coworkers are talking negatively about them in a non-English language.262  
Employers also claim that English-only rules are implemented to increase 
workplace safety and product quality.263 
Language, however, is a racial characteristic as much as accent.  Thus, 
language discrimination is racial discrimination.  The onus is on the 
plaintiff to show that the employer instituted the English-only rule in an 
effort to cleanse the workplace of racial otherness.  Plaintiffs would be able 
to sue under the disparate treatment prong—a desirable happenstance 
inasmuch as plaintiffs with successful suits under the disparate treatment 
prong may be awarded legal damages, whereas legal damages may not be 
awarded for plaintiffs suing under the disparate impact prong.264  As in the 
accent discrimination context, an employer cannot argue that it is a BFOQ 
of the job that employees belong to a certain race (i.e., speak English) 
because, as noted above, race may never be a BFOQ.265 
Language discrimination cases are harder than accent discrimination 
cases because it will usually be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the 
proffered justifications for the English-only rule are mere pretexts for the 
desire to rid the workplace of indicators of racial nonwhiteness.  Plaintiffs 
may have a difficult time proving that the employer was not interested in 
easing tension or promoting safety, but rather was interested in forcing 
employees to hide their racial otherness.  Easy cases would be those in 
which an employer institutes an English-only rule for particular Spanish-
speakers (i.e., Mexicans and Dominicans) while excluding other, more 
racially privileged Spanish-speakers (i.e., Argentinians and Spaniards).  
 
 260. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding 
that plaintiffs could bring a disparate impact claim after an employer instituted an English-
only rule although the rule only affected the “terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment” and did not impose a barrier to hiring or promotion). 
 261. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting a disparate 
impact claim brought by a plaintiff who was fired after he spoke Spanish on the job, thus 
violating an English-only rule). 
 262. See, e.g., Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d at 1483 (explaining that the employer instituted 
the English-only rule after employees complained that some Spanish-speaking coworkers 
were making derogatory, racist comments about them and noting that the policy was 
intended to promote racial harmony in the workplace). 
 263. See, e.g., id. (noting that the employer thought that “the English-only rule would 
enhance worker safety because some employees who did not understand Spanish claimed 
that the use of Spanish distracted them while they were operating machinery, and [that it] 
would enhance product quality because the U.S.D.A. inspector in the plant spoke only 
English and thus could not understand if a product-related concern was raised in Spanish”). 
 264. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006) (“In an action brought by a complaining party under 
[Title VII] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an 
employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) . . . the complaining 
party may recover compensatory and punitive damages . . . from the respondent.”). 
 265. See supra note 257. 
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Other easy cases would be those in which an employer institutes a rule that 
prohibits the speaking of some languages (i.e., Spanish), while allowing the 
speaking of other, more racially privileged languages (i.e., Italian).  
However, one could reasonably expect that such easy cases would be 
rarities.  Yet, even in hard cases, in which an employer has instituted an 
English-only rule with general applicability and for seemingly defensible 
reasons, a racialized group may be able to prove that the English-only rule 
was implemented with the intent to discriminate against them on the basis 
of race.  This is especially true if the environment was already one in which 
they were being generally mistreated. 
Consider the facts behind EEOC v. Central California for Health.266  In 
this case, a group of Filipino employees sued their employer under Title 
VII, alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin after the 
employer instituted an English-only rule that prevented the plaintiffs from 
speaking Tagalog and other Filipino languages in the workplace.267  The 
plaintiffs also alleged that the English-only rule was instituted in an 
environment marked by anti-Filipino racial hostility.  The complaint alleged 
that management held meetings that only the Filipino employees were 
required to attend.  During these meetings, they were informed about the 
English-only policy and told that management was considering installing 
surveillance equipment to insure that the plaintiffs did not violate the 
policy.268  Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that Filipinos were “regularly 
taunted, admonished and threatened” and that supervisors regularly 
ridiculed the English that plaintiffs did speak.269  In this case, and in similar 
cases, the plaintiffs would have an easier time proving that the English-only 
rule was not instituted to increase workplace safety or to ease racial 
tensions.  The policy seems to be a product of the desire to compel the 
plaintiffs to hide their particular instantiation of racial otherness.  As such, 
it should be cognizable as racial discrimination, as opposed to the 
discrimination on the basis of national origin that was alleged.270 
 
 266. First Amended Complaint in Intervention at 8–10, EEOC v. Cent. Cal. for Health, 
2012 WL 2872791 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2011) (No. 1:10-cv-01492-LJO-JLT).  The litigation 
was later settled, and the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $975,000 in addition to other 
injunctive relief. Proposed Consent Decree at 10, Cent. Cal. for Health, 2012 WL 2872791 
(No. 1:10-cv-01492-LJO-JLT). 
 267. First Amended Complaint in Intervention, supra note 266, at 2. 
 268. Id. at 8 (“Defendants held mandatory meetings and required only Filipino employees 
to attend.  During the meetings, management staff reprimanded the Filipino employees who 
attended and told them that they were prohibited from speaking Filipino languages and that 
they were required to speak English at the hospital.  Management also threatened to install 
surveillance equipment to monitor them . . . .”). 
 269. Id. at 9.  Plaintiffs also alleged that the English-only policy was applied in a 
discriminatory manner. See id. (“Defendants did not target any non-Filipino employees for 
such strict enforcement of its language policy, nor did it ever subject its non-Filipino 
employees to the same meetings, heightened scrutiny, threats, warnings and disciplinary 
actions to which it subjected Filipino employees.  Non-Filipino employees—including 
supervisors, doctors and nurses—regularly spoke in languages other than English without 
being monitored or censured.”). 
 270. Id. at 2. 
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In sum, conceptualizing race in a way that does not tether it to false 
biological origins enables a reconceptualization of what constitutes racial 
characteristics, which can create a more amenable legal landscape for those 
challenging employer practices under Title VII.  At present, the Title VII 
case law misperceives race, and plaintiffs suffer from the misperception.  A 
reoriented conception of race and racial discrimination may allow plaintiffs 
to be vindicated in instances that the current case law disallows. 
CONCLUSION 
Biological race is responsible for genocides, ethnic cleansings, slavery, 
eugenics, antimiscegenation laws, and various other diminishments of the 
humanity of racialized individuals.  That is quite a legacy.  It is disturbing 
that American law in the twenty-first century continues to reflect one of 
modernity’s most dangerous fabrications.  This Article has revealed two 
areas in which biological race has most obviously informed the construction 
of the legal landscape:  American Indian jurisprudence and Title VII case 
law.  It is time for the law to be rid of the myth.  This Article has offered 
practical steps for reimagining these areas of law in such a way that they 
reflect what race really is—a pragmatic tool used to index essentialized 
difference. 
This project of reimagination is important not solely because the law 
built around the notion that racial biology exists is bad law.  It is also 
important because law invariably influences society and culture.  To the 
extent that the law reflects biological race, the culture will reflect biological 
race.  In turn, a culture saturated with the belief that racial biology is a truth 
will produce law that is saturated with the belief that racial biology is a 
truth.  And the alarming dialectic will continue to turn. 
This Article seeks to disrupt the dialectic.  If law refuses to reproduce the 
myth, then the culture will be less inclined to believe the mythology.  In 
turn, the culture will produce a law that does not reflect the myth.  A more 
healthful and scientifically accurate dialectic will turn.  And we, as a 
society, would be one step further removed from our lamentable history and 
one step closer to producing a world that will never have to witness the next 
genocide. 
